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EUROPEAN SPECTRUM
MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
PATRICK S. RYANt

I.

FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY IN EUROPE
A.

INTRODUCTION

Analysis of international frequency-related organizations can take
many different directions. One common approach is to start with the
broadest organizations, such as the United Nations' International Telecommunications Union ("ITU"),' and then work down from there to the
more "regional" bodies and standards-setting organizations in Europe or
the United States, such as the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute ("ETSI") and the American National Standards Institute

("ANSI"). 2 This kind of a broad-ranging analysis can sometimes be helpful because it casts a wide net that covers interested parties and issues
worldwide. Nonetheless, such an analysis tends to overlook many of the
new developments at the European Union, by far one of the most influential regional bodies in terms of spectrum management. Thus, in this article, we will address the developing spectrum management role of the
various European organizations and provide an overview of the policies
that these organizations have implemented.
We will begin by covering aspects of developing laws within the European Union, as well as discuss member countries' attempts to coordinate their regulatory efforts in a relentless move away from
telecommunications monopolies and towards free markets. It is important to note that consideration of the concept of spectrum management
t Attorney, PSR Law Firm, LLC. The author studied law at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium) (PhD, 2004), the Universitat St. Gallen (Switzerland) (MBL-HSG,
2003), and the University of Texas at Austin (JD, 2000). The author is grateful to Carolyn
Daughters for editorial and rewriting support and to Jos Dumortier and Wendy McCallum
for comments and suggestions for improvement.

1. See generally ITU, Welcome to the InternationalTelecommunications Union, http://

www.itu.int (accessed Jan. 2, 2004).
2. See e.g., Christoph Wagner & Andreas Grinwald, Rechtsfragen auf dem Weg zu
DVB-T, 19-23 (Vistas 2002).
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at the European Union level has begun only recently because frequencies
have traditionally been allocated, allotted, and assigned by the individual states. In fact, there is great uncertainty as to how-and if-the European Union will undertake a comprehensive harmonization effort in
spectrum management (It is, however, noteworthy that two European
officials recently compared European spectrum policy to Gerald Faulha3
ber and David Farber's analogy to intellectually bankrupt GOSPLAN
initiatives, and even extending the analogy to characterize the dearth of
a comprehensible European spectrum policy as a "black hole"). 4 For this
reason, this article will be considerably descriptive in nature, and it will
provide an overview of the important technology-related actions taken by
the European Union in past years, including the implementation of technology promotion programs (e.g., the RACE program, described below)
and the passage of the "new framework" for telecommunications and its
associated Radio Spectrum Decision. 5 By analyzing past actions, we will
be able to make sound predictions for the future.
At the outset, it should be stated (particularly for the American
reader) that any discussion of European policies is a complicated one, in
part because the (ostensibly simple) word "Europe" means different
things to different people. 6 At the present time, the European Union has
expanded to twenty-five countries, 7 two additional countries may become
3. See Gerald R. Faulhaber & David J. Farber, Spectrum Management: Property
Rights, Markets and the Commons, 100xlO0network.org/papers/faulhaber-brookings2002.
pdf(Dec. 2002) (providing a description of GOSPLAN (the former Soviet Union's committee
for economic planning)).
4. See Ruprecht Niepold, PoliticalAgenda for Communications from the Commission
Perspective, http://europa.eu.int/information-society/topics/radio-spectrum/docs/ppt/ceptconfpolitical.ppt (accessed Apr. 12, 2004) (comparing the "regulator" to GOSPLAN in slide
11 and referring to Europe's spectrum management role as a "black hole" in slide 12); see
also Frank Greco, Frequency Management Reform: The EuropeanImplications,http://www.
tilburguniversitynl/tilec/events/conferences/07052003/greco.pdf (accessed Apr. 12, 2004).
5. Please refer to the Appendix for an overview of the various legislative actions associated with the "new framework."
6. First, a comment on the various uses of the word "Europe." Within this article,
"Europe" generally refers to those European countries that belong to the European Union.
However, "Europe" can sometimes be used in a much broader sense to include European
countries that are not members of the European Union, such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Iceland. These countries belong to the European Free Trade Association, a separate economic community. See EFTA, European Free Trade Association, http:l!
www.efta.int (accessed Mar. 30, 2005). "Europe" can also sometimes refer to countries
whose borders extend into both the European and the Asian continents (e.g., Turkey). To
further complicate the matter, the term "European Community" often refers to the institutions of Europe (e.g., the European Commission and the European Parliament). The reader
is asked to interpret the meaning of the word "Europe" on a case-by-case basis, depending
upon the context in which it is used.
7. The European Union developed out of a plan, set forth by French Foreign Minister
Robert Schuman in 1950, to form a fusion of coal and steel industries in France and Ger-
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provisional members within the next three years,8 and other countries
may join thereafter. 9 These countries represent a multitude of cultures,
languages, and legal traditions. To state that there is a "European" approach to a given matter is to risk making inherently flawed generalizations about diverse peoples, cultures, and systems. However, since we
are providing a high-level review of the European approach to economic
integration (and drawing conclusions from that approach in an attempt
to assess the forthcoming European spectrum management methodology), some generalizations are both necessary and inevitable.
B.

LETTING

Go OF

THE

PTTs

One generalization is rather safe to assert: The traditional regulatory model in Europe has been based on a state-run monopoly structure
that has concretely changed only within the past ten years. Private ownership of telecommunications networks is a very new concept, as is the
growth and consolidation of equipment providers. Law and economics
scholar Eli Noam has summarized the twentieth-century European approach to telecommunications as follows:
For a century, telephony throughout Europe had been a ubiquitous,
centralized, hierarchical network operated by a monopolist. The operating entity was usually a state administration for post, telephone and
telegraph ("PTT"), though in some instances the post was separated
from telecommunications. The entire arrangement was therefore
known as the PTT system.... The physical and organizational structure of PTTs was hierarchical. Major policies were set by technical experts, largely outside public scrutiny.... It was not merely a technical
system, but a social, political and economic institution based on the
sharing of resources and the transfer of benefits towards favored
groups, often the economically weak and almost always the middle class
10
and farmers.
many. An invitation was extended to other countries to participate, and the first "union,"
which began in 1951, included France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium,
and Luxembourg. These countries signed the Treaty of Paris and became known as the
European Coal and Steel Community. This collective underwent successive waves of expansion and later became known as the European Community (now, the European Union).
In 1973, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark joined; in 1981, Greece; in 1986,
Spain and Portugal; in 1995, Finland, Sweden, and Austria; and in 2004, Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic,
and Slovenia. See generally Weatherhill & Beaumont, infra n. 42, at 2-23.
8. Bulgaria and Romania are scheduled to become provisional members in 2007. See
Jan Silva, Bulgaria, Romania OKd for 2007 EU Entry, The Guardian, (Apr. 13, 2005)
(available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-4934530,00.html).
9. Turkish Cyprus, Turkey, and other countries may join. See European Union Enlargement, Enlargement, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/ (accessed Apr. 11, 2004).
10. Eli Noam, Telecommunications in Europe 3 (Oxford Press 1992) [hereinafter:
Noam, Telecommunications in Europe].
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Thus, the PTT system was heavily engrained in a social structure
that sought to equalize social systems, providing consumer protections
and instituting and fulfilling important pluralistic objectives. 11 The
state-run PTT structure remained in place throughout most of the twen2
tieth century and began to break apart only in the late 1980s.1
Although liberalization of European economic trade can be traced as
far back as the 1951 Treaty of Rome (discussed below), the liberalization
of European telecommunications actually began with the fracturing of
the PTT structure, a process that was initiated in earnest with the June
10, 1987, Green Paper on the development of the common market for
liberalization and harmonization of the telecommunications services and
equipment. 13 Although the Green Paper is not law, its terms nonetheless set the stage for countries within Europe to allow private (i.e., nonstate-run) industries to produce equipment for other markets on a much
broader scale than before. At the time that the Green Paper was published, simple telecommunications devices like telephones could not be
purchased in one European country and used in another. 14 In the
United States, where a dominant AT&T structure existed throughout
the 1970s, equipment like telephones and answering machines could be
used in all fifty states. This was not the case in Europe, where, for example, French devices did not work in neighboring Belgium.1 5 Thus, European countries came to realize that individual state-run monopoly
structures could (and perhaps should) compete on an international level
in order to improve the long-term viability of those structures and to derive lasting economic benefits. As commentator Joachim Scherer notes,
the PTT monopolies would need to be dissolved in order to enable international competition. Though the total number of market players would
be reduced, the aggregation of likeminded firms across the European
continent would finally allow European companies to compete with large
international private companies like IBM, AT&T, Lucent, and
11. See Peggy Valcke, Pluralisme in een Digitale Interactieve Mediaomgeving 103-213
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, July 2003) (describing the history of
pluralism and the importance of maintaining it within a European context).
12. See Noam, Telecommunications in Europe, supra n.10; see generally, James E
Darnton and Daniel A Wuersch, The European Commission's Progress Toward a New Approach for Competition in Telecommunications, 26 Int'l Law 111 (1992).
13. Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunication
services and equipment, COM(87) 290 (July 30, 1987).
14. See Paul Gannon, Regulating Europe'sFragmentedMarket, Network Eur. 19 (Sept.
1994) (discussing the standardization of terminal equipment).
15. See generally Donald A. Mader and Soren Kroigaard, Achieving Harmonization of
Product Safety Standards, Compliance Engineering, (Nov.fDec. 1999) (available at http:l!
www.ce-mag.comnarchive/1999/novdec/guesteditorial.html) (describing the harmonization
process for various items in Europe, and noting that "[sltandards for electrical plugs and
sockets may be among the last electrical equipment in Europe to become harmonized").
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Motorola.16
This restructuring is taking place now. Numerous former state-subsidized equipment manufacturing companies that flirted with failure for
years either have turned around after receiving massive subsidies and
state protection (e.g., Bull in France) 17 or have evolved into completely
different organizations by changing their strategies and integrating with
former competitors (e.g., Olivetti in Italy).' 8 Other companies have
16. See Joachim Scherer, Asymmetric Re-regulation of Telecommunications Under European Community Law, in Asymmetric Deregulation 207-08 (Eli Noam & Gerard Pogorel
eds. 1994). Scherer explains that the implementation of the policy goals of the 1980s Green
Paper would require a major restructuring and breakup of the PTT monopolies.
17. The French computer manufacturer Bull was heavily funded by the state. In 1993,
the French government gave the ailing company over $4 billion in subsidies. At the time,
the government loudly declared that it would never again "bail out the company," and subsequent moves were made to privatize the company. Charles Fleming, France Promises
Bull $1.2 billion in Aid, Names New Chief Ahead of Privatization,Wall Street Journal
Europe 3 (Oct. 19, 1993) (noting that the total aid granted to Bull in 1993 exceeded $4
billion and that the European Commission was investigating the matter). However, the
government did indeed bail out the company on subsequent occasions. In 1994, the government gave an additional $1.7 billion to Bull, and in 2002 the government granted the company an additional $500 million to keep it from bankruptcy. Kevin J. Delaney, France to
Give Bull Another Lift Up, Wall Street Journal Europe A4 (Mar. 15, 2002). The story has a
bittersweet ending. After the company experienced years of compounding losses, Pierre
Bonelli took over the CEO office in December 2001 and initiated a dramatic restructuring
to bring the company to profitability without state aid. On March 31, 2004, the company
announced its first quarterly profit in recent history. However, Bonelli-the man credited
with the company's turnaround-died on April 1, 2004, the day following the announcement. See Nathalie Brafman, Disparition: Pierre Bonelli, Prdsident de Bull, Le Monde
(Apr. 3, 2004).
18. Olivetti is a very old Italian company that initially sold typewriters and that later
entered into a failed computer venture with the help of heavy state subsidies (in this regard
its story is similar to Bull's). After struggling for years, the company became profitable in
1999 for the first time, and it made an offer to purchase Telecom Italia, a company seven
times its size. The Economist colorfully described the plan as follows:
BRAVA Olivetti! Such panache-and such folly. Like the deep-sea dragon fish
with its dislocatable jaw, the cocky Italian telecoms firm has bared its teeth at a
colossus seven times its size. Telecom Italia, the startled target, is a former state
utility and the sixth-largest telephone company in the world. To make the takeover bid announced on February 20th even cheekier, only 18 months ago Olivetti
was barely breathing (and that thanks to government life-support and credulous
investors), let alone in a state to attack rivals. Years on the brink [of bankruptcy],
veering from typewriters into personal computers and out again into telecoms, had
lost the firm trillions of lire and three-quarters of its staff. After but one year of
profits, it now looks as though the applause has gone to Olivetti's head.
The Economist, Gulp, www.economist.com (accessed Feb. 25, 1999) (subscription req'd).
Indeed, Olivetti's bold move seems to have set the stage for another confusing series of
acquisitions, mergers, and investments. Tire maker Pirelli, computer maker Olivetti, and
Telecom Italia all formed an unusual partnership shortly after Olivetti's successful bid.
Then, another investor came in-the Benetton family, of clothing line fame. The resulting
(and highly unusual) telecommunications/rubber/computer/clothing conglomerate has bewildered most experts. See Deborah Ball, A Tale of Blue Blood, Sweaters and Tires, Wall
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failed and are currently liquidating their assets (e.g., Grundig in Germany). 19 Although this process is somewhat painful, several very strong
telecommunications service providers are emerging, and some of these
companies are buying American rival firms (e.g., Deutsche Telekom
bought U.S. wireless provider VoiceStream, 20 and the UK's Vodafone

Street Journal A12 (July 31, 2001) (describing the history of the Olivetti, Pirelli, and
Benetton companies and their interest in Telecom Italia); Telecom Italiato FinanceTie- Up,
Wall Street Journal Europe M5 (Mar. 12, 2003). The article describes the complications of
the new structure as follows:
Telecom Italia ... is expected to unveil a reverse merger today with Olivetti in a
move to simplify Telecom Italia's controlling structure, people familiar with the
companies said. Italy's largest telecommunications firm is the last link in a chain
of eight holding and operating companies that resulted after two takeovers - first
by Olivetti and then by manufacturer Pirelli SpA - in two years. Analysts have
long called on [Telecom Italia Chairman] Mr. Tronchetti Provera to streamline
this pyramid-style ownership, which makes financial analysis difficult.
Id.
19. Grundig is a well-known German manufacturer of television sets and radios. The
company suffered great losses and was unable to compete with more efficient rivals Philips
(Netherlands) and Siemens (Germany). Philips provided Grundig with some cash investment in 1994; however, after several years of losses, Philips began distancing itself from
Grundig. Ultimately, Philips pulled the plug in 1997. Grundig tried to restructure and to
enter into other markets, but in 2003 the company filed for bankruptcy. Portions of the
company have since been liquidated and sold off to others. See Martin du Bois & Silvia
Ascarelli, Philips in Last-Ditch Plan to Restructure Grundig Unit, Wall Street Journal Europe 3 (Feb. 6, 1996) (describing the Philips takeover and the 1996 "ultimatum" to the
company); Martin du Bois, Botts-Led Investor Group Acquires 43% of Grundig, Wall Street
Journal Europe 3 (July 21, 1997) (describing Philips' withdrawal from Grundig and the
acquisition of certain shares by private investors in an attempt to rescue the company);
David Scheer, German Bankruptcies Post Record in April, Wall Street Journal Europe A2
(July 21, 2003) (noting that German bankruptcies would exceed 37,600 in 2003 and
describing the Grundig filing as an example of a German "industrial pillar" that has failed);
Global Business Briefs-Automotive:Delphi Corp., Wall Street Journal A16 (Nov. 18, 2003)
(noting that a company had purchased some of Grundig's assets in the liquidation process);
see also Grundig, Grundig Corporate History, http://tinyur.com/24k4b (describing the
many products that Grundig had on the market). Of course, because of the liquidation
process that is now underway, documentation of the corporate history exists only through
2002.
20. See William Boston & Yochai Dreazen, U.S. Regulators to Clear VoiceStream Acquisition, Wall Street Journal Europe 1 (Apr. 5, 2001). The article describes the VoiceStream acquisition, which was controversial because Deutsche Telekom is still heavily
owned by the German government and because, under U.S. Department of Justice regulations, only private entities may own telecommunications businesses. In fact, one reason
why the acquisition was approved by regulators is due to the fact that the dilution of shares
reduced state ownership to a minority stake. Id. As Boston and Dreazen note, "Deutsche
Telekom faced some opposition from lawmakers because it is still controlled by the German
government, which holds around 58% of the company. The government's stake will fall to
around 45% after the VoiceStream deal closes." Id.
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has made a major investment in Verizon 2 ' and even considered purchasing AT&T Wireless). 2 2 Furthermore, a powerful European core of equipment providers exists (e.g., Finland's Nokia, Sweden's Ericsson, France's
Alcatel, and Germany's Siemens), 23 and these companies are giving their
American counterparts more than a run for their money. For example,
Alcatel almost bought U.S. giant Lucent during a troubled period in
2001,24 and Nokia-originally a Finnish lumber company-has completely transformed itself. The company, famous for its mobile handsets,
has risen to world dominance, 25 and it has recently begun expanding
27
6
into digital television receivers 2 and gaming products.
The simultaneous process of expansion and consolidation within Europe is still at the very early stages, and it impossible to predict how the
landscape will look in coming decades. Nonetheless, European telecom21. Vodafone bought 44.3 percent of Verizon Wireless in April 2000. See Verizen, Verizon Wireless CFO Presentationat Vodafone (Sept. 27, 2004) (describing the joint venture of
Verizon and Vodafone) (available at http://investor.verizon.com/news/20040927/).
22. Vodafone Group PLC, based in the United Kingdom, has become the world's largest wireless carrier. In fact, it has recently announced plans to acquire AT&T Wireless
Services in the United States. See Jesse Drucker et. al., Vodafone Weighs Two Bids: AT&T
Wireless or Verizon?, Wall Street Journal Europe Al (Feb. 10, 2004). Drucker notes that:
Vodafone Group PLC, the world's biggest wireless carrier, finally announced Monday that it is considering acquiring AT&T Wireless Services Inc., the third-largest
U.S. wireless carrier. But people close to Vodafone said the company has also explored - at least theoretically - what some have dubbed the Big Bang theory: the
carrier could simply buy all of Verizon Communications Inc., keep the wireless
business and spin off the rest of the company.
Id.
23. See And Then Came the Europeans,The Economist (Mar. 11, 1999) (detailing Siemens' purchases of smaller American manufacturers and describing European telecommunications companies' strategies for expansion into the U.S. market).
24. See David Schepp, Alcatel-Lucent Deal Faces Obstacles, http://news.bbc.co.uk/lVhi/
business/1343273.stm (accessed Apr. 11, 2004).
25. See The Economist, A Finnish Fable, http://tinyurl.com/2g3aa (accessed Apr. 12,
2004). The article describes Nokia's transformation as follows:
Few would dispute the claim that Nokia has been Europe's outstanding business
success story of the past decade. A couple of decades ago, it was a stodgy Finnish
conglomerate, making everything from rubber boots and cables to lavatory paper
and televisions. Even in that form, it had come some way from its start, in 1865, as
a lumber mill on the banks of the Nokia river ....
There are few cleverer or more
focused companies than Nokia anywhere. . . .'Finns live in a cold climate: we have
to be adaptable to survive.'
Id.
26. See Nokia, Nokia Mediamaster 100 S, http://www.nokia.com/nokia/0,8764,
28147,00.html (accessed Apr. 12, 2004) (describing a new product designed for digital television reception).
27. Scott Moritz, Nokia Back in the Game with N-Gage, http://www.thestreet.com/tech/
scottmoritz/10153845.html (accessed Apr. 14, 2004). Moritz describes the Nokia N-Gage
product and the company's amazing ability to innovate. Id. According to Moritz, Nokia's
game launch is an example of the company's "ability to respond quickly to the fickle tastes
of a dynamic market." Id.
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munications companies are unquestionably a force to be reckoned with.
How do the success stories of European equipment and service providers
relate to the future of European spectrum management? As we will see,
looking to the past will help us to predict the future.
Technology-related concerns were not a major consideration of the
1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community ("EEC"). In fact, the "information society" infrastructure that
now forms a central part of the European Union policymaking process
was then viewed as a sovereign function to be reserved for the member
states. 28 Telecommunications and frequency management were viewed
as "natural monopolies," and it was commonly held that the state must
retain complete control over networks in order to serve the public and to
ensure policy objectives like universal service were met.2 9 Of course, in
1957 the only real technology networks were those for television, radio,
and voice telephony, and, not surprisingly, the Treaty of Rome did not
contain any special provisions for telecommunications networks. 30 However, little more than one year after the Treaty of Rome was passed, Europe decided to organize a meeting to discuss telecommunications (and in
particular, frequency) coordination efforts, which eventually led to a regular conference called the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations ("CEPT"). This conference set the stage for
31
a policy agenda that continues through today.
28. See Simon Underwood, The Information Society and Telecommunications Policy, in
Guide to EU Policies 270 (Gl6ckner, et. al., eds., Blackstone Press 1998).
29. Id.
30. Also note that Article 90 (now Article 86 after the renumbering) of the Treaty of the
European Community gave states the opportunity to limit competition rules for telecommunications services, which are considered to be "services of general economic interest."
This Article was later superceded by the Competition Directive (96/19/EC) and more recently the LiberalizationDirective (2002/77/EC).
31. The Conference Europbenne des Postes et T6lcommunications ("CEPT") was
founded in 1959, and it included a broader range of members than the signatories to the
Treaty of Rome. For example, Switzerland, Turkey, and Spain (then under the Franco
regime) were members of CEPT, but they were not signatories of the Treaty of Rome. The
CEPT grew to include former East Bloc countries only after the 1990s. A complete list of
the signatories and the dates that they joined the CEPT is as follows: 1959, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey; 1963,
Cyprus, Liechtenstein, and Vatican; 1967, San Marino; 1969, Monaco; 1970, Malta; 1990,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania; 1991, Albania; 1992, Croatia and Lithuania;
1993, Czech Republic, Estonia, Moldova, and Slovakia, and Slovenia; 1994, Bosnia Herzegovina, Latvia, and Russia; 1995, Andorra, Macedonia, Ukraine; 2001, Azerbaijan; 2002,
Serbia and Montenegro; and 2003, Belarus. See CEPT, European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations, http://www.cept.org (accessed Mar. 31, 2005). See
BT Archives, Events in Telecommunications, http://www.bt.com/archives/history/19461959.
htm (accessed Apr. 27, 2005).
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THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT

Unlike the United States, where all frequency-coordination measures are taken up by a federal oversight group [the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") or the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration ("NTIA")],32 Europe still manages its frequencies at the state level through its National Regulatory Agencies
("NRAs"). 3 3 In the past, such a management role might have been incorporated as a function of the state-run PTT agency or defense ministry;
however, the spectrum management function within the European
Union is required to be distinct from that of the former PTTs (that is,
spectrum management must not be carried out by a current network
34
operator).
In most countries, the NRAs manage only the spectrum allocated for
civil use (which is akin to the functioning of the FCC), and within that
scope government organizations such as the police force and internal security services are sometimes also involved. 35 Military use of the spectrum is generally controlled by the national ministries of defense, which,
in practice, means that thirty to fifty percent of the usable radio spectrum is managed by bodies other than the NRAs. 3 6 Regulation of military frequency use is carried out by military defense organizations in
connection with military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), though coordination of spectrum management
32. The FCC is responsible for civil coordination of the spectrum, while the NTIA deals
with governmental ownership of the spectrum. See Notice of Inquiry, United States Spectrum Management Policy For the 21st Century, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/spectrumreform/noticeOfInquiry.htm (Feb. 2, 2004) (describing the respective roles of the FCC
and the NTIA and proposing further collaboration between the two).
33. See Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger and Mathias Strasser, A Closer Look at Telecom
Deregulation:The EuropeanAdvantage, 12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 561, 581-82 (1999) (describing the functioning of the European NRAs and their correlation with the liberalization
movement).
34. In the past, many of the PTTs operated telephone networks and were state-run
organizations with close ties to other state-run functions (e.g., the allocation of frequencies). See Steven Dov Lando, The European Community's Road to TelecommunicationsDeregulation, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 2159, 2177 (1994) (describing the role of the PTTs and
noting the European laws that required splitting certain responsibilities: "The Services Directive addressed the problem of the PTs' being both referee and player in the telecommunications markets by requiring a body independent of the telecommunications organization
to control certain licenses, specifications, frequency allocations, and surveillance of usage
conditions. These provisions responded to the concern that PTTs suffered from inherent
conflicts of interest, and challenged the long-standing tradition that gave the PTTs free
reign in the telecommunications markets").
35. See generally, Robert Queck, The Future of National TelecommunicationsRegulatory Authorities, in 2 The Journal of Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications Information and Media 251, 259 (2000).
36. Id.
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functions between the NRAs and NATO differs on a country-by-country
37
basis.

D.

EUROPEAN HARMONIZATION

The rationale for European Community involvement in frequency
management stems from the underlying objectives of the European
Union set forth in the Treaty of Rome 38 and the Maastricht Treaty. 3 9
These treaties provide that the European Union shall develop an internal market that allows the free movement of goods and services in order
to ensure that competition in the internal market is not distorted and
that trans-European networks are created. 40 Thus, radio frequency
management has a European-wide character to it, and the European
Union sees great value in providing transparent, non-discriminatory access to the wireless spectrum. 4 1 The European Union's action in this
regard is constrained only by concepts of subsidiarity, 42 proportional37. See Richard E. Wiley, The Media and The CommunicationsRevoluation: An Overview of the Regulatory Framework and Developing Trends, PLI Order No. G4-3868, Nov. 78, 1991, 326PLI/Pat 469, 626 (describing the roles of various organizations and NATO in
frequency coordination: "the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example,
practices multilateral spectrum management. Frequently, countries engage in bilateral negotiations and agreements to accomplish their spectrum management goals").
38. Treaty of Rome (EC/EEC Treaty), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
39. Treaty on the European Union (TEU) signed at Maastricht on Feb. 7, 1992, 1992
O.J. (C 191) 1, (C 224) 1. The Treaty on European Union became effective Nov. 1, 1993.
40. See Milda K. Hedblom and William B. Barrison, An Uncertain Sound: The European Union's Plan for the Information Society, 12-WTR Comm. Law. 15, 18 (Winter 1995)
(describing the European Council's efforts to create trans-European networks through satellite technology: "The Council took note of the intention of the Commission to consider its
authority under the Treaty of Rome to suppress restrictions on access to space capacity");
see generally, Lisa L Garrett, Commerce Versus Culture: The Battle Between the United
States and the European Union over Audiovisual Trade Policies, 19 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com.
Reg. 553, 557 (Summer 1994) (describing the broad influence of the Treaty of Rome on
trans-European networks and audiovisual initiatives).
41. See Decision No. 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7
March 2002 on a Regulatory Framework for Radio Spectrum Policy in the European Community, enacted Apr. 24, 2002, O.J. L 108/1. (describing the purpose in one of the recitals of
the decision as follows: "A policy and legal framework ... needs to be created in the Community in order to ensure coordination of policy approaches and, where appropriate, harmonized conditions with regard to the availability and efficient use of radio spectrum
necessary for the functioning of the internal market in Community policy areas." Id., at
Recital 2).
42. Under the subsidiarity principle-arguably a form of federalism-the European
Union shall only take action if and only if the objectives intended to be achieved cannot be
"sufficiently achieved by the Member States." See Stephen Weatherhill & Paul Beaumont,
EU Law. The Essential Guide to the Legal Workings of the European Union 27-32 (Penguin
Books 1999) [hereinafter Weatherhill & Beaumont, EU Law] (describing the role of the
subsidiarity principle).
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ity,4 3 and non-discrimination. 44 These concepts will be discussed below.

In 1990, Council Resolution 90/C 166/02 set out the basic approach
to frequency planning, allocation, and coordination at the European
Union level. 4 5 The Resolution foresaw that the framework for spectrum
management harmonization would be managed by the CEPT, which also
set up the European Radiocommunications Office ("ERO"), a permanent
body that facilitates the European-level coordination of spectrum management issues. (The functioning of the ERO is explored further below.)
Further, the CEPT and the ERO are expected to coordinate closely with
industry, users, and standards-setting bodies (e.g., ETSI). The Resolution requires that the CEPT have sufficient resources to undertake its
activities efficiently, respond rapidly to the demands of industry and government, and make long-term plans for spectrum use.4 6 Finally, the
to
CEPT provides the principle framework used by the European Union
47
prepare common positions for presentation at ITU conferences.
In 1992, the European Union passed Council Resolution 92/C 318/
01, which reinforced its support of the CEPT and determined that the
CEPT, rather than a separate body within the European Union, would
be the primary mechanism for spectrum management. 48 As we will see
below, the European Union recently took further steps towards asserting
more direct control of the spectrum by passing the Radio Spectrum Deci43. The concept of proportionality requires that European Union action must be necessary in order to attain the particular objective. The concepts of proportionality and subsidiarity are closely related. Whereas subsidiarity constitutes a limitation on European
Union powers with respect to member states, proportionality is applied between the European Union and its citizens. Id. at 527.
44. A non-discrimination clause is found in Article 6 of the EC Treaty, which requires
that "any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall be prohibited." Thus, Germany may not grant preference to wireless operators from Germany, and it must open up
the markets for investment from all other European states.
45. The Council of the European Communities, Council Resolution of 28 June 1990 on
the Strengtheningof the Europe-Wide Cooperationon Radio Frequencies,in Particularwith
Regard to Services with a Pan-EuropeanDimension (90/C 166/02), http://europa.eu.int/
ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/ 90c16602.html (accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
46. Id. (as stated in the recitals: "Whereas, therefore, the current mechanisms set up
by CEPT should be equipped with the necessary resources to undertake a long-term analysis of frequency requirements, taking account of market demand, standards requirements
and development of products and the requirements of other users of the radio spectrum").
47. Id. at 4 (describing the coordination role as follows: "The European Union shall
develop common European positions in relation to the use of the frequency spectrum concerning international frequency harmonization, in particular with regard to the ITU and
its relevant administrative radio conferences, using mechanisms set up by CEPT").
48. The Council of the European Communities, Council Resolution of 19 November
1992 on the Implementation in the Community of the European Radiocommunications
Committee Decisions (92/C 318/01), http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/92c3
1801.html (accessed Mar. 31, 2004) [hereinafter Council Resolution 92/C 318/011.
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sion. 49 Thus, the 1992 Resolution intended that CEPT resolutionscalled European Radiocommunications Committee ("ERC") Decisionswould provide the primary means of ensuring the provision of frequencies for European-wide radio services. 50 These ERC Decisions would be
subject to integration with additional working methods, including input
and consultation from various unspecified parties that may from time to
time include ETSI and the European Commission. 51 In summary, the
Resolution left many of the details to be developed through a consultative process among the member states, ETSI, the CEPT and the Commission. Clearly, however, the NRAs and the European member-state
governments preferred that harmonization would be carried out through
the CEPT rather than through a separate European Union organization.
Following the 1992 Resolution, the European Union produced a
Communication on a new approach to frequency coordination in Europe. 52 This Communication set forth a plan for what would later form
aspects of the new telecommunications framework (see the Appendix for
further details). The first objective of this plan was to secure certain radio frequencies for implementation and operation in order to encourage
competition within Community-wide trans-European systems and services and to foster the creation of an internal market for radio communications services and equipment. The second objective was to allow the
creation of Community-wide markets and aggregations in order to
achieve economies of scale for the introduction of new equipment, particularly equipment that had been harmonized to meet European stan49. ANACOM, Decision No. 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 7 March 2002 on a Regulatory Framework for Radio Spectrum Policy in the
European Community, http://www.icp.pt/txt/template20.jsp?categoryId=58697&contentld=93373 (accessed Mar. 31, 2005) [hereinafter: Radio Spectrum Decision].
50. Council Resolution 92/C318/01, supra n. 49, at 7 (having established that the
CEPT decisions are implemented through the European Radiocommunications Office, the
Resolution "[I1nvites the Commission and the Member States and the CEPT to support the
further development of the new framework set up by the CEPT, including the setting up of
the European Radiocommunications Office on the basis of an appropriate statute, making
available all the resources necessary to ensure the efficiency of its operation and the rapidity of its response to demands, in the light of the obligations of the Member States under
the Community law in particular competition rules and the general policy goals").
51. Council Resolution 92/C 318/01, supra n. 49, at 4. The "ERC is developing
working methods to allow wide consultation with telecommunication organizations and
other service providers, industry and users, and cooperation and interaction with the European Telecommunications Standards Institute ("ETSI") and the Commission of the European Communities." Id.
52. Eur-Lex, Communication from the Commission Concerning a Proposalfor a Council Decision on the Implementation by the Member States of Measures Concerning Radio
Frequencies:A New Approach to the Coordinationof Radio Frequencies in the Community,
COM (93) 382 O.J. C 266, 01/10/1993 0011, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lexAex/Notice.do?val=
197485&lang=sl&checktexte=checkbox&pos=1&page=1 (accessed Apr. 15, 2005).
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dards. The third objective was to ensure a common European approach
to the ITU conferences in order to safeguard European interests at the
international level.
In addition to these three objectives, the Communication included a
proposed Council Decision that suggested that European-level action
would be limited to that which was necessary to achieve community action (thus keeping in line with the subsidiarity and proportionality principles). Where required, action would be undertaken selectively in
recognition of the fact that support measures would be preferred to systematic harmonization. Accordingly, the plan expressed a preference for
upholding the continued strength of the NRAs. Moreover, the proposal
suggested that the ERO would take a primary role in the identification of
Europe-wide frequency needs, and it empowered the ERC Decisions secondarily by stating that European action would only be undertaken if the
Decisions were not implemented by the member states or if they were
not implemented within a reasonable timeframe. However, the proposal
did not define the terms of such a timeframe, and it in fact left a number
of issues up for debate.
In 1994, the European Commission published a Green Paper on Mobile and Personal Communications, 5 3 and soon thereafter, in June 1995,
the Council adopted a resolution stipulating that a more balanced allocation of the spectrum should be sought. 5 4 As the resolution indicated,
such an allocation would need to occur within the framework of the activ55
ities of the ERC and in accordance with the Council Resolution of 1990.
The resolution also noted the possibility of using the ERC Decision mechanism to find suitable bands for mobile and personal communications
technologies. 56 However, the resolution did not offer any concrete proposals for determining which bands should be allocated to which services, nor did it provide guidance on how users might migrate between
bands. That same year, the European Parliament passed a resolution
that supported the Green Paper proposals and that pointed out the need
to establish a regulatory authority to manage frequencies at a European
53. Green Paper on Mobile and Personal Communications on a Common Approach in
the Field of Mobile and Personal Communications in the European Union.
54. Eur-Lex, Council Resolution of 29 June 1995 On The FurtherDevelopment of Mobile and Personal Communications in the European Union 95/C 188102, http://europa.eu.
int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexdoc!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31995
Y0722(02)&model=lex (accessed Apr. 15, 2005).
55. The first recital of the 1995 Resolution cites the previous work done by the Council,
including a footnote reference to the 1990 resolution, it references 'framework of the activities of the European Radiocommunications Committee (ERC) and in accordance with
Council resolution 90/C 166/04 of 28 June 1990." Id. at I 3(h). Further, the 1995 Resolution specifically built upon 'the Commission's intention of supporting the creation of a European Mobile and Personal Communications Services Forum." Id. at 6.
56. Id. at I 3(h).
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level. 5 7 Although there is no clear evidence of frustration, one might
surmise that the passage of this resolution was spurred by the Parliament's frustration that it had little direct input into ERO activities and
that it had little say in the ERO role of frequency management.
The tides, then, had already started to shift by the time the European Union passed the Council Decision on Satellite Personal-Communication Services in 1997.58 Article 3 of this Decision set out an approach
for cooperation between the European Union and the CEPT under which
the European Commission would provide the CEPT and the ERO with
"mandates" for harmonizing frequency use and with associated conditions attached to general authorizations. 59 This process would start
with mandates regarding satellite personal communications services ("SPCS"). Although the Decision only remained in force for three years, it
was the first to set the tone for future actions concerning direct European Union involvement through this "mandate" structure. 60
All told, since 1987 the Council, in cooperation with the European
Parliament, has adopted fifteen directives and decisions that are either
directly or indirectly related to spectrum management at the pan-European level (in fact, most have been adopted in the last few years). Table
1 describes these fifteen directives and decisions.
Table 1 European Council Directives and Decisions, 1987 to the Present
Date
6/25/87

Decision or Directive
Council Directive 87/372/
EEC

Description
Deals with frequency bands to be reserved for the
coordinated introduction of public pan-European
cellular digital land-based mobile communications
in the Community ("GSM").

57. Resolution of the Commission, Communication to the European Parliament and
the Council, Towards the PersonalCommunications Environment: Green Paperon a Common Approach in the Field of Mobile and PersonalCommunications in the European Union
(COM(94)-145-C4-0061/94) and on the Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on the Consultationon the Green Paper on Mobile and Personal
Communications (COM(94)0492-C4-0046/95), A4-0097/95.
58. Decision No. 710/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March
1997 on a Coordinated Authorization Approach in the Field of Satellite Personal-Communication Services in the Community, Official Journal L 105, 23/04/1997, at 0004-0012 (no
longer in force), http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/satperen.htm (accessed
Apr. 15, 2005).
59. Id. at Art. 3 ("The Commission shall, in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 7, give CEPT/Ectra and CEPT/ERC mandates to harmonize frequency use and the
conditions attached to general authorizations for satellite personal-communications services, without prejudice to the scope established in the licensing Directive for individual
licences. Those mandates shall define the tasks to be performed and lay down a timetable").
60. Id.
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Table 1 European Council Directives and Decisions, 1987 to the Present
Date
Decision or Directive
Description
10/09/90 Council Directive 90/544/ Deals with frequency bands designated for the
EEC
coordinated introduction of pan-European landbased public radio paging in the Community
("ERMES").
6/03/91

Council Recommendation
91/288/EEC

Deals with the coordinated introduction of digital
European cordless telecommunications ("DECT")
into the Community.

3/24/97

Decision No. 710/97/EC
of the European
Parliament and of the
Council

Deals with a coordinated authorization approach in
the field of satellite personal-communication
services in the Community.

11/28/97

Council Decision 97/838/
EC

Concerning the conclusion on behalf of the
European Community, as regards matters within
its competence, of the results of the WTO
negotiations on basic telecommunications services
(OJ L 347, dated December 18, 1997).

6/22/98

Directive 98/34/EC of the
European Parliament
and of the Council

Establishing a procedure for the provision of
information in the field of technical standards and
regulations (OJ L 204, dated July 21, 1998).

12/14/98

Decision No. 128/1999/
EC of the European
Parliament and of the
Council

Concerning the coordinated introduction of a thirdgeneration mobile and wireless communications
system [Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System ("UMTS")] in the Community.

3/09/99

Directive 1999/5/EC of
the European
Parliament and of the
Council

Concerning radio equipment and
telecommunications terminal equipment and the
mutual recognition of their conformity [Radio and
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment
("RTTE") Directive].

03/07/02

Directive 2002/19/EC of
the European
Parliament and of the
Council

Concerning access to and interconnection of
electronic communications networks and associated
facilities.

03/07/02

Directive 2002/20/EC of
the European
Parliament and of the
Council

Concerning the authorization of electronic
communications networks and services.

03/07/02

Directive 2002/21/EC of
the European
Parliament and of the
Council

Concerning a common regulatory framework for
electronic communications networks and services.

03/07/02

Decision No. 676/2002/
EC of the European
Parliament and of the
Council

Concerning a regulatory framework for radio
spectrum policy in the European Community
(Radio Spectrum Decision) (O L108/1, dated April
24, 2002).

07/26/02

Commission Decision
2002/622/EC

Establishing a Radio Spectrum Policy Group (OJ L
198/49, dated July 27, 2002).

07/29/02

Commission Decision
2002/622/EC

Establishing a Radio Spectrum Policy Group (Press
Release IP/02/1171).
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Table 1 European Council Directives and Decisions, 1987 to the Present
Date
3/20/03

Decision or Directive
Commission
Recommendation

Description
Concerning the harmonization of the provision of
public R-LAN access to public electronic
communications networks and services in the
Community (OJ L78/12, dated March 25, 2003).

The Radio Spectrum Decision has already had (and will continue to
have) a significant impact on telecommunications and radio spectrum
policy. We will discuss the role of this Decision (together with the "new
framework") in Section 0. As we will see, the European Union has consistently attempted to increase its role directly at the international level,
specifically with regard to the role it plays in World Radiocommunications Conferences ("WRCs") at the ITU level. Although the European
Union has only an "observer" role at the WRCs, the European Union
published a Communication at the 1997 WRC that set the stage for more
direct interaction. 6 1 The European Council responded positively to this
Communication, and it invited the Commission to set up further coordi62
nation and contact with the CEPT and the ERO.
E.

KEY ACTORS IN EUROPEAN TECHNOLOGY POLICY

Several organizational entities play a role in developing general European technology policies. Although these entities are widely known
within Europe, the U.S. reader may not be familiar with them, so they
will be briefly described here. Europe's key technology policy objectives
are often referred to generally as the "information society," or "INFOSOC." Thus far, the European Commission has taken the lead on
making sure that Europe remains at the forefront of technological developments. In fact, the Commission has always acted independently of the
states (since it is part of a quasi-federal system), and it has been able to
promote policies that are not constrained by the sometimes narrow views
of the former national telecommunications monopolies.
1.

The Commission and Technology

The European Commission divides its work into various Directorates-General ("DGs"). 63 The DGs for Telecommunications (now called
61. Communication on the World Radiocommunications Conference 1997 (WRC-97),
European Commission. COM (97) 304, final Brussels, 18 June 1997.
62. Draft Council Conclusions on the Communication of the Commission Relating to
the World Radiocommunications Conference 1997.
63. There are separate DGs for numerous activities, including the following: Agriculture, Budget, Competition, Development, Economic and Financial Affairs, Education and
Culture, Employment and Social Affairs, Energy and Transport, Enlargement, Enterprise
and Industry, Environment, EuropeAid, European Anti-Fraud Office, Eurostat, External
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"Information Society and Media"), 6 4 Enterprise and Industry, 65 and specialized initiatives for Audiovisual 66 have the main responsibility for setting INFOSOC policy. DG Competition 67 has also played an important
(and active) role in the field of telecommunications regulation. 68 While
one might assume that political rivalries could undermine the possibility
Relations, Fisheries, Health and Consumer Protection, Humanitarian Aid, Information Society and Media, Internal Audit Service, Internal Market, Interpretation, Joint Research,
Justice and Home Affairs, Legal Services, Personnel and Administration, Press and Communication, Publications Office, Regional Policy, Research, Secretariat General, Trade,
and Translation. See EUROPA, Directorates-Generaland Services, http://europa.eu.intl
comm/dgs-en.htm (accessed Mar. 31, 2005) (providing links to all the DGs).
64. See EUROPA,Activities of the European Union: Information Society, http://europa.
eu.int/pollinfso/indexen.htm (accessed Apr. 13, 2004). The opening message on the
homepage emphasizes the importance of the convergence of mobile telephony and the
Internet:
Practically non-existent 15 years ago, mobile phones are everywhere. The Internet provides endless streams of online information. We are offered a bewildering array of programs and services as high-capacity digital systems bring together
the formerly separate worlds of broadcasting and telecommunications. This
revolution in information technology is creating the information society - at home,
at school and at work. The European Union and its policies and actions have
guided and supported the revolution since the beginning.
Id. (emphasis added).
65. See EUROPA, Activities of the European Union: Enterprise, http://europa.eu.int/
polenter! indexen.htm (accessed Apr. 13, 2004). Like the Information Society homepage,
the Enterprise Policy homepage emphasizes technology in its mission statement:
While modern and often successful, European business and industry cannot afford
to rest on their laurels. It is a constant challenge to remain competitive and keep
up with technology. Meeting the challenge successfully is essential for sustainable
growth and for our greater prosperity. EU enterprise policy plays its part by fostering innovation, entrepreneurship and competitiveness in manufacturing and
services.
Id. (emphasis added).
66. See EUROPA, Activities of the European Union: Audiovisual, http://europa.eu.int/
polav/index.en.htm (accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
67. See EUROPA, Activities of the European Union: Competition, http://europa.eu.int/
pollcomp/ index-en.htm (accessed Apr. 13, 2004). Yet again, this division emphasizes technology in its mission statement:
Effective competition is crucial to an open market economy. It cuts prices, raises
quality and expands customer choice. Competition allows technological innovation
to flourish. For this to happen, fair play on the part of businesses and governments is essential. The European Commission has wide powers to make sure they
stick to European Union rules on fair trade in goods and services.
Id. (emphasis added).
68. As of the completion of this article, negotiations had failed regarding a settlement
in a very complicated case between Microsoft and the European Competition Authority
that had been underway for almost five years. See Sir Bill and His Dragons - Past,Present
and Future, The Economist (Jan. 29, 2004) (providing an overview of antitrust lawsuits
against Microsoft in the United States and in Europe); see also Commission Press Release
IP/0402 (Mar. 24, 2004). The Commission has imposed a fine of EUR 497 million on
Microsoft for abuse of its market power within the EU, required changes in the way that
the company packages its products, and required the company to disclose interface details
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of close interaction and collaboration between these DGs, for the most
part the exact opposite is true. Cooperation between the DGs is widespread, as demonstrated by many groups in the development of a green
paper on convergence. 6 9 Of course, as one might surmise, the Commissioners who lead the various departments are not always in agreement
(as is the case in any democratic government system). However, opposing viewpoints are a hallmark of European policy development, and progress on INFOSOC policy initiatives continues in spite of periodic
differences of opinion.
2.

Lobbies and Interest Groups

For reasons that we will describe, European-level lobby groups are
relatively underdeveloped, at least when they are compared with similar
efforts in the United States. It is much more complicated to "lobby" in
Europe, because of different languages, cultures, and national interests.
Furthermore, in Europe many strong networks of national operators,
particularly telecommunications companies, continue to be backed by
state power and state investment. Deutsche Telekom's largest investor,
for example, continues to be the German government. 70 Large companies such as Deutsche Telekom and UK's Vodafone have strong lobbies
and entire departments responsible for garnering support for their efmeetings
forts, and they regularly participate in spectrum coordination
71
(often referred to as spectrum trading "workshops").
F.

EUROPEAN STANDARDS SETTING

In the 1980s, nearly every European country had its own technological standards for products ranging from telephones to electrical appliances. At the outset of the 1990s, for example, the European Union still
had not reached a decision on what a common electrical plug would look
of its Windows Media Player to competitors. In a Press Release, Competition DG Mario
Monti emphasized that
[d]ominant companies have a special responsibility to ensure that the way they do
business doesn't prevent competition on the merits and does not harm consumers
and innovation ... [our] decision restores the conditions for fair competition in the
markets concerned and establish clear principles for the future conduct of a company with such a strong dominant position.
69. Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implicationsfor Regulation, ip/97/1073, 3 (Dec. 1997).
70. See Mark Landler, Progressat Deutsche Telekom After Returning to Its Roots, N.Y.
Times W1 (May 18, 2004) (discussing the protection from competition that Deutsche
Telekom still enjoys since the government owns 43% of its shares).
71. See e.g., Workshop on Frequency Spectrum Management in Telecommunications,
May 7 2003 at Tilburg University (Netherlands), proceedings available at http://www.
tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/events/ conferences/07052003/ (accessed Apr 16, 2005).
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like7 2 (e.g., a hair dryer purchased in France would not work in England
without use of a special adaptor). Thus, in order for these different countries to function as a single economic unit, it was determined that various European-wide standards needed to be set. 7 3 In its Green Paper on
the development of a Community Telecommunications Policy (1987), the
European Commission undertook a similar approach with regard to the
standardization of telecommunications, establishing ETSI so that it
could work with the other bodies that had already developed electrical
standards, such as the European Committee for Normalization ("CEN")
and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
("CENELEC"). 74 Earlier, we mentioned that strong communication
plays a critical role in helping the various European institutions work
together. This is certainly the case for CENELEC, 7 5 which is expected to
collaborate closely with the ERO (based 1,058 kilometers away in Copenhagen, Denmark) and ETSI (based 1,174 kilometers away in Sophia An76
tipolis, France).
72. See Commission Green Paper on the Development of European Standardization:
Action for FasterTechnological Integrationin Europe, COM(90) 456, 2 (Oct. 8, 1990). The
Green Paper discusses electrical plugs, considering even the most basic concepts such as
what an electrical plug should look like:
Let us take domestic electrical appliances as an example. Technical safety requires the presence in the electrical lead of a third wire, connected to the earth....
The Commission will see whether the twelve Member States all require this third
wire ...if not, Community legislation will provide for an earth connection for this
type of appliance throughout the Community, without going into the details of
whether the third pole should be round or square, or placed in the middle or at the
edge of the plug.
Id.
73. The European Community passed Council Directive 83/189/EEC on March 28,
1983. Council Directive 83/189/EEC (Mar. 28, 1983). The Directive mandated cooperation
between the members of CEN and CENELEC and set forth the first significant mechanism
to standardization and unification of various standards throughout the European countries. Id.
74. "CEN" stands for Comitd Europ~en de Normalisation, and CENELEC is the corresponding body for electrical standards.
75. CEN and CENELEC were established in the 1960s. According to the Commission
Green Paper on the Development of European Standardization (1990), the Commission
should continue to encourage industry to work with these centralized interfaces in order to
promote European standards throughout the world.
76. Note that the U.S. standards-setting equivalent organizations are located-almost
without exception-in the same city as the federal government: Washington D.C. Thus,
Washington D.C. is the home for the government's FCC and NTIA, as well as the independent (but influential) American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the Institute for
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), and dozens of other associations and lobbying
groups. For better or for worse, it is possible (and even common practice) for lobbyists and
interested parties to travel between the organizations within a given day or week in order
to promote their interests. Because of geographical splintering of institutions, however,
lobbying of this nature would not be possible in the European Union.
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In sum, standardization has recently moved into the realm of the
wireless spectrum. As discussed below, the European Union established
the Radio Spectrum Committee and the Radio Spectrum Policy Group
("RSPG") in 1992, and these groups are expected to continue to promote
standards in areas of wireless communications.

G.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE MINISTRIES OF POST,
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE

Until the early 1980s, European telecommunications were managed
by iron-clad state-run monopolies that controlled access to telecommunications services (and to many other services, such as banking and mail
delivery) through a chokehold maintained by the PTT ministries. The
shackles began to shake loose in 1979 when a proposal advanced to the
European Commission recommended the formation of joint standards
and the long-term development of an integrated digital network throughout the European Community. 7 7 This proposal led to the development of
two initiatives known as ESPRIT (European Strategic Program for Research and Development in Information Technology) 78 and RACE (Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies for
Europe). These development programs underscored the fact that the
privileged status of the PTTs must ultimately give way to market forces
if Europe is to remain competitive in the worldwide technology marketplace. In the early 1980s, Europe's PTTs began to realize that an integrated broadband network could not be developed unless they
79
It
relinquished monopolistic power in favor of concerted joint efforts.
thus became clear that if the directors of the PTTs did not foster change
themselves, they would be forced to do so. As professor Wayne Sandholtz
notes, the RACE initiative and its preceding efforts together formed the
"hook that eventually brought in the [PTTs]." s °
However, by the late 1980s, all of the members of the CEPT committee for GSM specifications were state-owned PTTs, with the exception of
a few members from the UK (e.g., Cellnet, and Vodafone).8 1 The re77. See Wayne Sandholtz, High-Tech Europe: The Politics of InternationalCooperation
226 (University of California Press 1993).
78. ESPRIT is by far the largest of the Research and Technological Development
("RTD") programs established by the European Commission. It has involved more than
9,000 organizations of various types throughout Europe. See generally Esprit, Welcome to
Esprit, the EU Information Technologies Programme, http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/home.
html (accessed Feb. 28, 2004).
79. Sandholtz, supra n. 77, at 240.
80. Id.
81. See Friedhelm Hillebrand, GSM and UMTS: The Creation of Global Mobile Communications 287 (Friedhelm Hillebrand ed., 2001).
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marks of Alan Cox, a commentator who participated in many of the early
GSM specifications, are telling:
[Slome were from old-fashioned PTTs who did not permit most staff to
use mobile phones since they were for the bosses only! Thus some delegates [who were defining technical specifications] had never used a mobile [phone] before, yet [they] were 8being
asked to specify how the next
2
generation [of phones] would work.
As Cox indicates, the individuals who were assigned the task of developing the technology specifications had in many cases no familiarity with
that technology whatsoever. It soon became apparent to all involved
that the PTTs needed to evolve into a smaller, more agile, more efficient,
and more market-based organization.
As mentioned earlier, in 1987 the Commission launched an inquiry
(a so-called "Green Paper")8 3 on telecommunications policy.8 4 The Green
Paper insisted that liberalization of the telecommunications industry in
Europe was required in order for Europe to maintain a competitive edge
worldwide and for any of the ideals of RACE to be realized, and the objectives that it set forth are still valid today.8 5 The PTTs were slow to react,
but they knew that their hand had been forced. Thus, the Green Paper
included a proposal for a compromise by the government monopolists:
The PTTs would be allowed to retain monopoly rights over voice telephony and networks, and services would become open to private providers.8 6 Further, the Green Paper insisted on an open network provision
that outlined the premise for a common set of standards and interfaces
for the operation of a transnational network. This provision, in turn,
gave birth to Commission initiatives to lobby the CEPT to create ETSI,
82. Id.

83. Green Papers are discussion papers published by the Commission on a specific policy area. They are primarily documents addressed to interested parties-organizations
and individuals-who are invited to participate in a process of consultation and debate. In
some cases, these documents provide an impetus for subsequent legislation. Most Green
Papers published since 1984 are available online at an EU archived Web site. EUROPA,
Official Document: Green Papers, http://europa.eu.int/comm/ offgreenindex.en.htm (accessed Oct. 4, 2003).
84. Towards a Dynamic European Economy. Green Paper on the Development of the
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290 (June

1987).
85. See SCADPlus, Information Society: Introduction, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/

leg/ en/lvb/124100.htm (accessed April 17, 2005) (describing the history of the policy-making efforts in Europe and highlighting the important objectives of the 1987 Green Paper as
follows: "the telecommunications policy was launched in 1987 through a Green Paper on
telecommunications liberalisation. It pursued three major objectives which retain all their
validity today: [1] to liberalise the markets segments under monopoly; [2] to harmonize the
European telecommunications sector through common rules and standards; [and] [31 to
strictly apply competition rules to liberalised market segments to prevent collusive agreements and the creation and abuse of dominant positions."
86. See Id.
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which would direct standards-setting efforts. ETSI was the first truly
coordinated European standards-setting body for telecommunications
that was entrusted with the task of collaborating closely, not just with
PTTs, but also with representatives from private industry.
The proposal to open up value-added telecommunications services
and terminal equipment to the free market was controversial among several PTTs, which hoped to retain their monopolies. A legal battle ensued, and the European Commission took the position that enterprises
that claim "exclusive or special rights" to provide such services must ad87
here to the Commission's Treaty of Rome provisions on competition.
According to the Commission, the PTT monopolies violated the treaty's
antitrust terms (as defined by Article 86).88 Various PTTs challenged
this position at the European Court of Justice, but the position was nonetheless upheld.8 9 As a result, it was determined that the PTTs would be
abolished. 90

H.

THE

RACE

PROGRAM AND COORDINATED TECHNOLOGY POLICY

European policymakers realized that by setting up an ambitious
technology objective-the development of a pan-European market for
telecommunications services and equipment-they would motivate major operators, manufacturers, and users to join together in the pursuit of
common beneficial goals, including standardization, and later, eEurope
and the now famous "Information Society" ("INFOSOC"). European economic and technological growth, however, would require much more
than standardization of plugs and appliances, and in 1985 a precursor to
RACE (called "Project R 1043") was launched in order to lay the groundwork for many phases of RACE program development meetings. Be87. See Council Resolution of 30 June 1988 on the development of the common market
for telecommunications services and equipment up to 1992, 88/C 257/01, O.J. 257, 4/10/
1988 p. 0001-0003, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServALexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEX:31988Y1004(01):EN:HTML (accessed Apr 16, 2005), (referencing the 1987
Green Paper and stating that the "major policy goals" for the European Union include "creating or ensuring Community-wide network integrity as one of the essential elements for a
common market in telecommunications services and equipment, working on the principle
of full interconnectivity between all public networks concerned in the Community." Id. at

Art. 1).
88. Article 86 is one of the key competition law provisions in European Law that deals
with the interaction of state-induced monopolies and exclusive rights. Full text available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art86-en.html
(accessed
Apr. 16, 2005).
89. Spain, France, Belgium, and Italy joined together in an ECJ proceeding. See ECJ,
Judgment of 17 November 1992, Cases C-271, C-281 and C289/90, Spain v. Commission
(1992), ECR 1-5833; see also Pierre Larouche, Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications 48-49 (Hart Publg. 2000) (describing the challenges and
proceedings).
90. See generally Weatherhill & Beaumont, supra n. 42, at 1008-1012.
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cause of the rapid growth of telecommunications in Europe, several
European industry ministers wanted to first launch this "definition
phase" 9 1 of the RACE program. 92 This phase established the need for
and the subsequent scope of a collaborative European framework in telecommunications research and development, and shortly thereafter, in
1987, Europe officially launched the RACE program within the Second
Framework for Research and Development. 93 The main objective of
RACE was to introduce Integrated Broadband Communications (IBC)
and to initiate the shift towards Europe-wide services by 1995. This definition phase involved the following objectives:
1. Support the formation of a single European market for telecommunications equipment and services.
2. Promote the European Community's telecommunications industry.
3. Enable European network operators to compete under the best possible conditions.
4. Enable a critical number of member states to introduce commer94
cially viable IBC services.
95
Well before the commercial introduction of GSM (i.e., in 1991-92),
the RACE community recognized that a new generation of mobile technology and services would be required after the turn of the century. In
the 1980s things started gaining momentum, and a work plan was developed in June 1987,96 whereby about twenty people, including industrial
organization representatives, telecommunications operators, PTTs, academics, and others, collaborated in order to cement common objectives
for technological deployment (including GSM and other characteristics of
mobile wireless telephony). Goals of the project included the provision of
speech and low-to-medium data services, with virtually complete geographical coverage, as well as the creation of plans to target very high
data rate services. 9 7 The project also specified various standards, interface parameters, and signaling and networking infrastructures, as well

91. Council decision of 25 July 1985 on a definition phase for a Community action in
the field of telecommunications technologies, 85/372/EEC (July 25, 1985).
92. Hillebrand, supra n. 81, at 115 (illustrating the details found in this article).
93. Council Decision of 14 December 1987 on a Community Program in the Field of
Telecommunications Technologies: R&R in Advanced CommunicationsTechnologies in Europe (RACE Program), 88/28/EEC; OJ L16/35 (Jan. 21, 1988).
94. Id.
95. See GSM World, History of GSM, http://www.gsmworld.com/about/history/index.
shtml (accessed Apr. 27, 2005).
96. Call for Proposals on Mobile Communications, RACE Program.
97. See Noam, Telecommunications in Europe, cited supra, n. 10, at 309 (describing
the objectives of RACE and its forward-looking objectives towards broadband and highspeed networks).
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as the preliminary requirements of the frequency spectrum. 98 In the
end, the project led to the birth of the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System ("UMTS").
By 1992, core UMTS concepts already formed the basis for further
development efforts, and the project team presented its achievements in
Germany in May of that year. 99 100 The driving motivation behind
UMTS was the demand for higher quality universal coverage (because of
the increased bandwidth) and more data options than those offered by
GSM. The standardized aspects of GSM would apply to UMTS designs.
Thus, mobile access would be guaranteed throughout the GSM footprint,
both indoors and outdoors, both in cities and in rural areas. In the early
1990s, it was estimated that the UMTS penetration rate would hit fifty
percent of the European market by 2005, translating into a subscriber
0 1
base of 100 million.'
The second phase of RACE took place within the context of the Third
European Framework Program. As this phase advanced, a number of
new activities were launched by the mid 1990s, particularly in the communication technologies arena. These initiatives aimed to embrace new
services constructed upon open standards in an attempt to continue the
interoperability of protocols and to stimulate the success of European
telecom providers (particularly Alcatel in France, Ericcson in Sweden,
Nokia in Finland, and Siemens in Germany). At the core of the RACE
program was a package of other "alphabet soup" initiatives that eventually led to the development of UMTS and Mobile Broadband Systems
("MBS"). These initiatives included the following:
* ATDMA. The Advanced Time Division Multiple Access project reviewed advances in TDMA technologies in order to provide a basis
for fair comparison between Code Division Multiple
Access
02
("CDMA") and Time Division Multiple Access ("TDMA").l
* CODIT. The UMTS Code Division Testbed project sought to test the
03
various functionalities of CDMA and to launch a test system.'
* MAVT. The Mobile Audio-Visual Terminal project aimed to develop
a joint European proposal for compression and multimedia
98. Note that these data were also published in the proceedings of the 1992 World
Administrative Radio Conference (WRC-92) and were made available through the ITU
database.
99. RACE Mobile Telecommunications Workshop, May 5-6, 1992, Nuremberg,
Germany.
100. See Hillebrand, supra n. 81, at 115.
101. Id. at 117.
102. See ATDMA, R2084: ATDMA - Advanced TDMA Mobile Access, http://www.

cordis.lu/infowin/acts/analysys/concertation/mobility/atdma.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2004).
103. See CODIT, R2020: CODIT - UMTS Code Division Testbed, http://www.cordis.lu/

infowin/acts/analysys/concertation/mobility/codit.htm (accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
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10 4

* MBS. The MBS project addressed the system concepts, techniques,
and technology required for the transition to the MBS, a forerunner
to UMTS. 10 5
" MONET. The Mobile Network project focused on network standards, including the
infrastructure and fixed aspects of launching a
10 6
UMTS system.
In light of the projects listed above, the second phase of the RACE program strongly emphasized standardization and close cooperation with
ETSI. Certain aspects of the program required more collaboration than
others, such as frequency propagation and channel modeling, the definitions for air interfaces and antennas, modulations, architectures, protocols, etc. Without standardization in these core areas, the seamless
digital wireless world that was envisioned would never have come to
pass.
I.

THE CONF9RENCE EUROPAENNE DES POSTES ET
TALPCOMMUNICATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN
RADIOCOMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

Very little-in fact, almost nothing-can be found in academic literature about the ERO, a small, almost stealth organization 10 7 located in
an understated office building in downtown Copenhagen. l08 The organization has a good web presence, 10 9 but because of the dearth of writing
on its history, purpose, and status, some space will be dedicated in this
article to it. 110 Indeed, the ERO is a relative newcomer to international
spectrum management, having been created "unofficially" in 1991 (by
virtue of a temporary Memorandum of Agreement) and "officially" in
104. See MAVT, RV2072: MAVT - The MobileAudio-Visual Terminal, http://www.

cordis.lulinfowin/acts/analysys/concertation/mobility/mavt.htm (accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
105. See MBS, R2067: MBS - Mobile Broadband System, http://www.cordis.lu/infowin/

acts/analysys/concertation/mobility/mbs.htm (accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
106. See MONET, R2066: MONET - Mobil Network Project, http://www.cordis.lu/in-

fowin/acts/analysys/concertation/mobility/monet.htm (accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
107. The organization's managers are quick to note that they work at the behest of the
governments that support them (principally the European Commission and Parliament).
Senior ERO staff often use the phrase "servants" to describe their manner of interaction
with CEPT members (i.e., ERO staff serve at the behest of their "client" CEPT members).
Interview with Soren Hess, ERO Deputy Director (Dec. 5, 2003).
108. ERO, Pleblingehus, Nansengade 19, DK-1366 Copenhagen. The office occupies
about half of one floor of a multistory building that houses Danish companies and other
businesses.
109. See ERO, European Radiocommunications Office, http://www.ero.dk (accessed

Mar. 31, 2005) (hereinafter "Welcome to ERO").
110. See generally Herbert Burkert, The Post-DeregulatoryLandscape in International
TelecommunicationsLaw: A Unique European Union Approach?, 27 Brook. J. Intl. L. 739

(2002) (providing a good history on the CEPT and its sister committees and conferences).
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1996 (after receiving funding and obtaining a permanent status). The
ERO is the progeny of the CEPT, and it was established to assist in setting standards for international radio-based communications.
First, a brief word on the ERO's parent, the CEPT. The CEPT lacks
formal executive power, and in order to discern the reason for this absence of high-level authority, one must look no further than the name
itself: The Conference Europ6enne des Postes et T6l6communications is,
in fact, a conference, not a formal entity or organization. The CEPT presidency rotates once per year, and the presidency is held by and hosted in
one of the forty-five CEPT member countries.'1 1 Over its forty-eight
years of existence, 1 12 the CEPT has never had a legal "personality" per
se. For example, it employs no full-time staff, nor is it recognized in a
legal capacity as an organization. Its infrastructure is less substantial
than that of the ITU, yet like the ITU its success relies heavily on consensus and voluntary cooperation. 1 13 The CEPT's source of power has
historically been found in the strength of its member PTTs. As the PTTs
have been dissolved and privatized (e.g., split into NRAs, operators, and
organizations like Belgium's BIPT), 1 14 however, their underlying power
has diminished accordingly.
The ERO thus started out almost as an experiment, perhaps one
that might keep the PTT spirit alive in an otherwise dying regulatory
regime that has invariably transferred supervisory authority (as well as
the monopoly-owned networks, accompanying bureaucratic inefficiency,
and commercial gains) from the state to private hands. The ERO was
launched at practically the same time as Europe's first commercial GSM
networks in 1991. Since that time, the ERO has become the official delegated authority of the CEPT for frequency and spectrum matters (even
111. In 2003, the presidency is held by the Swiss Telecommunications Regulator of the
Federal Office of Communications ("OFCOM") in Biel-Bienne, Switzerland. See Office Federal De La Communication, Page d'accueil, http://www.ofcom.ch (accessed Dec. 7, 2003).
112. The CEPT was founded in 1959, two years after the Treaty of Rome was passed.
See generally, CEPT, European Conference of Postal and TelecommunicationsAdministrations, http://www.cept.org (accessed May 25, 2005).
113. See ERO, European Radiocommunications Office: Electronic Communications
Committee (ECC), http://www.ero.dk/ecc (accessed Dec. 5, 2003):
As a general rule the ECC will act by consensus, otherwise by a simple majority of
votes cast, except where specific alternative provisions have been agreed ....
Consensus is defined as the general agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the concerned
interests and by a process that involves seeking to take into account the views of
all parties concerned and to reconcile any conflicting arguments. Consensus does
not imply unanimity.
Id.
114. BIPT is the Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Communications. See
IBPTBIPT, Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications, http://www.
bipt.be (accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
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though it bore an unofficial status for its first few years). 115 It oversees
various radio and telecommunications affairs of the forty-five CEPT
member countries, 116 and it is officially linked to the CEPT's Electronic
Communications Committee (ECC). 1 17 The ERO provides a center of expertise for long-term planning activities, and it also acts as a focal point
for consultations concerning spectrum management and regulatory matters. 118 The ERO's "experimental basis" was initially established
through a Memorandum of Understanding1 19 that defined the terms of
reference for the ERO, clarified its relationship with other committees
and conferences (most notably, the ECC), and outlined a preliminary
funding and budgetary model. 120 In 1996, the founding Memorandum of
Understanding was replaced by the "Convention for the establishment of
the European Radiocommunications Office." 1 2 1 Therefore, the Convention marked the establishment of the ERO, formerly a ghost-like conference of dying PTTs, as a permanent organization with a legal
personality, an organization responsible for entering into contracts, concluding agreements with States, and engaging in full-time representa115. See CEPT, CEPT Leaflet, http://www.cept.orgE50lD406-833C-4977-8D34-D9B69
723626E?frames=NO& (accessed Mar. 31, 2005) (hereinafter "CEPT Leaflet").
116. The forty-six member administrations (as of Feb. 2005) include Albania, Andorra,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and Vatican
City. See Welcome to ERO, supra n. 109; see also CEPT Leaflet, supra n. 115.
117. Established in 2001, the ECC replaced the European Committee for Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs ("ECTRA") and the ERC.
118. See ERO, European Radiocommunications Office: ECC Mission Statement and
Working Arrangements, http://www.ero.dk/4FCA7264-41C8-406A-A5FA-20E470818
BE4.W5Doc (accessed Apr 28, 2005) (herinafter, "ECC Mission Statement").
119. Memo of Understanding on the Creation of the European Radiocommunications
Office 1991 (hereinafter "MoU") (copy on file with the author) and described in detail in the
ECC Mission Statement. Id.
120. The MoU is quite vague in this regard. MoU Article 5 describes the "functions of
the office," which are primarily consultative. MoU Article 10 requires annual budgets to be
approved by a committee. Id.
121. The Convention for the Establishment of the European Radiocommunications Office ("ERO Convention") is dated June 23, 1993, but it only came into force on March 1,
1996, replacing the former MoU that had established the Office. In becoming contracting
parties, states had the choice to either sign the Convention prior to March 1, 1996, to take
effect from June 23, 1993, or to accede to the Convention after March 1, 1996. Like the
MoU, the Convention is not a public document, although a copy is on file with the author.
See 1.1.4.2 Convention - Anancom, http://www.icp.pt/templatel2.jsp?categoryId=66669
(accessed Apr. 28, 2005) (describing the Convention); see also ERO, ECC Mission Statement
and Working Arrangements, http://www.ero.dk/4FCA7264-41C8-406A-A5FA-20E47
0818BE4.W5Doc (accessed Apr 28, 2005).
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tion of its members in radio spectrum matters. Of course, the PTTs
12 2
would quickly lose these same capabilities.
Voting and rights within the ERO are weighted. 123 Further, states
that are contracting parties to the Convention and that join the ERO do
not forfeit any sovereign rights with regard to their frequency management and apportionment regimes. 124 For example, although the ERO
regularly signs documents that are titled "decisions," these documents
really only offer recommendations and good-faith bases for cooperation.1 25 In addition, the CEPT organizations, such as the ERO and the
European Telecommunications Office ("ETO") Councils, often coordinate
their work with sister organizations, notably ETSI. 12 6 The mechanism
for coordination takes place through additional, separate Memoranda of
122. ERO Convention, Article 4, "Legal Status and Privileges."
123. ERO Convention, Annex A, stipulates that voting rights are weighted as follows:
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (25 voting units each); Switzerland (15 voting units); Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Turkey (10 voting units each); Ireland (5 voting
units); Albania, Czech Republic, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Croatia, Cyprus, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Vatican City (1 voting unit each).
124. ERO Convention, Article 18, to wit: "Nothing in this Convention shall interfere
with the sovereign right of each Contracting Party to regulate its own
telecommunications."
125. See e.g., CEPT/ECTRA Decision of July 3, 1997 on harmonisation of authorisation
conditions and coordination of procedures in the field of Satellite Personal Communications
Services (S-PCS) in Europe, operating within the bands 1610-1626.5 MHz, 2483.5-2500
MHz, 1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz. European Radiocommunications Office - Implementation, ECTRAIDEC(97)02, http://www.ero.dk/documentation/docs/implement.asp?
docid=1829 (accessed Dec. 5, 2003). The S-PCS decision has formed a general (theoretical)
frequency standard throughout CEPT countries, although it is still "under study" in some
countries (e.g., the Czech Republic) and is only partly implemented by some other countries
(e.g., Turkey). Although the decision was passed in 1997, the ERO noted that as of December 5, 2003, it had been implemented by only thirteen of the CEPT's forty-five member
countries. See id.
126. See Joel R Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules through Technology, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 553, 591-92 (1998) (describing the role and functioning of ETSI as follows: "traditional standards organizations like ... ETSI, and committees like T1 are the real political centers ofLex Informatica. Yet these groups are generally
not governmental organizations. Rather, they tend to be consortia of interested persons
and companies." Id.) The ETSI Statutes, adopted on Nov. 21, 1990, state that representatives of the Community and EFTA shall enjoy special status as "Counselors" at both the
General Assembly and the Technical Assembly. Article 17 states that ETSI shall establish
close working relationships with other European standards bodies. Statutes available at
docbox.etsi.org/mts/mts/05-Meetings/ARCHTVE/1997/TD MTS24/td92_297.doc (accessed
Feb 25, 2003). The Statutes do not address the question of sovereignty or obligations under
the EC Treaty. See generally, Council Directive of 28 June 1990 on the Establishment of
the Internal Market for Telecommunications Services through the Implementation of Open
Network Provision, 90/387/EEC, available at httpJ/europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoclegregdocs/
90387eec.html (accessed Apr 29, 2005). For more on ETSI, see infra.
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Understanding that specify procedures for collaboration in the development of standards for systems or equipment and for the harmonization of
frequency bands and regulatory requirements. 12 7 Joint ERC, European
Committee for Telecommunications Regulatory Affairs ("ECTRA"), and
ITU groups also prepare for ITU Council meetings and Plenipotentiary
Conferences. 128 While the framework largely remains one of cooperation
and coordination, the Radio Spectrum Decision has begun to change the
role of both the ERO and the CEPT, helping it to slowly evolve into more
of a lawmaking and legislative effort (and, at the same time, initiating a
shift from voluntary compliance to legal mandate).
1.

Consultation and Long-Term Planning

The ERO is a classic "rule of multiple Cs" organization, meaning
that it relies heavily on consensus, compromise, collaboration, and culture.1 2 9 Since the ERO is a small organization with fewer than twenty
full-time staff members,' 30 it must rely heavily on the input of many
other parties. 13 1 It functions variously as a mediator, consultant, and
127. See Tapio Penkkala, Workshop, Strategic Plan for PMR/PAMR (Mar 28, 2003) at
slide 7, available at http://www.ero.dk/A9C70362-9F9D-4122-B7C0-C081397AEEE2 (accessed Apr 28, 2005).
128. See generally, Report on the Outcome of PP-02, CEPT Electronic Communication
Committee, Jan. 9, 2003, available at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/ra/topics/international'cept-pp-02report.doc (accessed Apr. 28, 2005) (describing the outcome of a joint
project between the CEPT and various sub groups in preparation for the ITU Pelipotentiary conference held in Marrakesh).
129. See Rob Frieden, International Telecommunications Handbook 9 (Artech House
1995). Mr. Frieden explains:
Both governments and carriers, which may still be government-owned, participate
in the consultative process, in which regular meetings are held and information is
shared, ostensibly to estimate demand and schedule future deployment of transmission facilities .... The combination of regulatory and business delegates in a
variety of forums has the consequence of merging points of view and institutionalizing a role for government even in matters affecting the strategic planning of an
individual carrier.
Id.
130. Per the ERO Web site, as of December 1, 2003, the total number of ERO staff is
sixteen persons drawn from different CEPT countries. This number includes nine experts
covering most fields within the radiocommunications and telecommunications areas and
seven administrative staff members (of which two are employed on a part-time basis). The
current Director is Thormod Boe (from Norway), and the current Deputy Director is Arturas Medeisis (from Denmark). The "experts" are specialists in engineering or radio communications, and the organization relies on the input of the member states-and now, the
EU Radio Spectrum Committee-for policy guidance. Interview with Soren Hess; see also
Welcome to ERO, supra n. 109.
131. It does not take many people to set standards so long as the input process is well
coordinated, and Europe is a forerunner in this process. See "Global Standards: Building
Blocks for the Future," Congress of the United States Office of Technology Development
March 1992, available at httpJ/www.gtwassociates.com/answers/OTA9220.pdf (accessed
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facilitator. One of the core ERO activities involves consultation with
other governments, with departments, and particularly (since the 2002
Radio Spectrum Decision) with the European Union. 13 2 The ERO also
provides guidance to public radiocommunications operators, manufacturers, users, private network operators, service providers, research institutes, and standards making bodies, 13 3 as well as to national,
European, and international organizations whose membership has an interest in European communications matters. One of the ERO's more important activities involves its organization of a CEPT-sponsored
134
conference (held approximately every twelve to eighteen months),
May 25, 2005) (noting the rapid growth of standardization in Europe at the time due to
ETSI); see also John Williamson, Raising the European Standard, Telephony, (June 3,
1991) (noting that with a staff of fewer than thirty people in 1991, the then newly formed
ETSI had quickly become one of the "world's fastest standards-making machines").
132. Communication between the ERO and the European Union has always existed,
although a number of European legal measures have marked Community-level harmonization significantly, particularly since 1999. See Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions, Towards a New Framework for Electronic CommunicationsInfrastructure
and Associated Services: The 1999 Communications Review, COM(99)539 final (Oct. 11,
1999). Other Community papers, proposed decisions, and decisions followed, such as the
following: Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy in the Context of European Community
Policiessuch as Telecommunications, Broadcasting,Transport, and R&D, COM(98)596 final (Dec. 1998); ParliamentResolution A4-0202/99 on the Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy in the Context of European Community Policies such as
Telecommunications, Broadcasting, Transport, and R&D (COM(98)0596 - C4-0066/99),
1999 O.J. (C 279) 72; Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament,the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Next
Steps in Radio Spectrum Policy: Results of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper,
COM(99)538 final (Oct. 11, 1999); and ParliamentResolution A5-0122/2000 on the Commission Communication to the Council, the EuropeanParliament,the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions on "Next Steps in Radio Spectrum PolicyResults of the Public Consultationon the Green Paper"(COM(99)538 - C5-0113/2000 - 2000/
2073(COS)), 2001 O.J. (C 59) 245. Additional legal sources include the following: Results of
the World Radiocommunications Conference 2000 (WRC-2000) in the Context of Radio
Spectrum Policy in the European Community, COM(00)811 final and Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Regulatory Framework for Radio
Spectrum Policy in the European Community, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 256. This proposal later
became the Radio Spectrum Decision, supra n. 49.
133. See John Peterson & Margaret Sharp, Technology Policy in the European Union 77
(Macmillan Press 1998). Note that one of the largest European standards-setting bodies is
ETSI, which was created by CEPT, which is also the parent of the ERO. See CEPTLeaflet,
supra n. 115 (noting that CEPT created ETSI in 1988). It is also generally said that ETSI
was born out of European Community technology policy-specifically, the 1987 Green Paper on Telecommunications-and that the liberalization of telecommunications during the
mid to late 1980s was considered an urgent matter. See generally ETSI, Welcome to ETSI,
The Home ofICT Standerdization, http://www.etsi.org (accessed Dec. 1, 2003).
134. Conference topics over the past thirteen years have included the following: Nov.
1991, A new framework for spectrum management in Europe; Nov. 1992, (a) Mobile systems, (b) Regulations: do they ease telecommunications? and (c) DSI II; Nov. 1993, (a) ERC

20051

EUROPEAN SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

307

where topics of radio frequency allocation and telecommunications are
discussed.
2.

Support for the Electronic Communications Committee

As noted previously, the ERO works alongside the ECC, which is
variously made up of different groups from the CEPT member countries.
In 2001, the ERC merged with the ECTRA to form the ECC.13 5 Ironically, the name "Electronic Communications Committee" does not contain the word "Europe," perhaps reflecting the fact that the ECC is part
of the CEPT, an organization that is larger than the European Union
itself.13 6 The ECC's mission is to address all forms of "electronic communications," which include "transmission, and where applicable, switching
or routing, which permits the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means, irrespective of the type of informa1 37
tion conveyed."
and (b) Frequency management; Nov. 1994, (a) ERC, (b) Aspects of"mobility," and (c) Key
spectrum and regulatory issues; Dec. 1995, (a) The digital revolution and (b) "Spectrum
roundup"; Nov. 1996, Regulation and legislation in a liberalised market; May 1998, Competition and convergence; Mar. 1999, Globalisation of radiocommunications; Oct. 2000, (a)
Global standardisation, (b) Mobile "convergence," (c) Satellite vs. terrestrial, and (d) Results of WRC-2000. See Darko Ratkaj, Spectrum Management in Europe, School on Radio
Use for Digital and Multimedia Communications (Trieste, Feb. 12, 2002), (available at
http://wireless.ictp.trieste.itschool_2002/lectures/ratkaj/SM-inEurope.PDF).
135. See ERO, ECC Mission Statement and Working Arrangements, http://www.ero.dkl
4FCA7264-41C8-406A-A5FA-20E470818BE4.W5Doc (accessed Apr 29, 2005) (noting that
the "ECC was established in September 2001 as a result of the merger between ECTRA
(responsible for general telecommunications matters) and ERC (responsible for radiocommunications matters").
136. See Gerry Oberst, Regulatory Review: Satellite Phraseology - The Language and
the Lingo, VIA Satellite (Mar. 1, 2002) (available at http://www.viasatellite.com); see also
TinyURL, http://tinyurl.com/717jq (describing the restructuring and noting the confusion
regarding the organizational shifts). The author explains: "Many of these changing acronyms merely add a bell and a whistle in order to invent a new word. But some changes in
acronyms are more important, as they point to new regulators or new legal structures." Id.
The author then describes the emergence of the ECC and notes that it is one of the more
important shifts. Id.
137. Titus Spoelstra, CRAF Handbook for Frequency Management (European Science
Foundation 2002). This definition has, itself, been somewhat harmonized within Europe
since the New Framework Directive. See The European Parliament and the Council of the
European Nation, Directive 2002/21 IEC of the European Parliamentand of the Council of
7 Mar. 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks
and services (Framework Directive), at Article 2 (Mar. 7, 2002). Note that the Spectrum
Decision, 676/2002/EC of March 7, 2002, uses a somewhat more generic definition that
covers the electromagnetic range rather than defining the radio spectrum by whether or
not it is used for communications: "[for the purposes of this Decision, radio spectrum includes radio waves in frequencies between 9 kHz and 3,000 GHz; radio waves are electromagnetic waves propagated in space without artificial guide." Id.
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The terms of reference for the ECC, which further clarify the Committee's objectives, include the following:
" Engage in forward planning and harmonize the efficient use of the
radio spectrum, satellite orbit, and telecommunications service
numbering resources in Europe so as to satisfy the requirements of
European users and industry.
" Consider, develop, and draft policies on electronic communications
in a European context, taking into account European and international legislation and regulations.
* Develop European common positions and proposals, as appropriate,
for use in the framework of international and regional bodies.
* Implement the strategic decisions of the Assembly.
* Seek guidance from the CEPT Assembly, as necessary, and propose
issues for consideration by the Assembly.
• Establish contacts with equivalent organizations outside of
Europe. 138
In order to carry out these objectives, the ECC has created several
working groups-as of December 2003, it had seven-that have established their own project teams in order to address specific issues. 1 39
While the agendas and activities of the different working groups clearly
overlap, each group focuses on its own specific matters and issues miscellaneous decisions or draft decisions. The term "decision," however, is actually a misnomer in this case, 140 since ECC decisions have no legal
influence and are not binding on any member. The working groups also
create Draft European Common Proposals ("ECPs") on miscellaneous
topics relevant to pan-European spectrum planning. Several of these
working groups are described below.
The Frequency Management ("FM") Working Group concentrates on
frequency allocation matters. This group is the leading CEPT/ECC
working group responsible for regulatory and technical preparations for
ITU Regional Radiocommunications Conferences, particularly the Stockholm 61 Agreement. 14 1 Its objectives are to harmonize frequency usage
138. See generally ERO, ECC Mission Statement and Working Arrangements, http:ll

www.ero.dk/4FCA7264-41C8-406A-A5FA-20E470818BE4.W5Doc (accessed Mar. 31, 2005)
(noting the work plan, terms of reference, and administrations of the ECC and discussing
the role of the ECC and its structure).
139. See Spoelstra, supra n. 137, at 36-37. CRAF provides detailed documentation of the
work of the ECC, and the information in the Handbook served as a basis for further research for the coverage in this section. Id.
140. See Rules of Procedure for the ECC, Article 12.1, http://www.anfr.fr/doc/docenligne/
ECC(01)05-ECC%20RoP.rtf (defining a "decision" as the "outcome of any decision making
process on matters of significant harmonisation in the electronic communications regulatory field") (accessed May 25, 2005).
141. The Stockholm 61 Agreement covers various aspects of European broadcast TV
spectrum allocation, standards, and regulation. It refers to the ITU Regional Radiocommunications Conference ("RRC") planned for 2004 and 2005. RRC, 04/05. See EBU-UER,
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in Europe wherever desirable and feasible and to develop common European positions on several matters. 14 2 This forum allows European frequency managers (typically government NRA representatives) to discuss
a wide range of problems of common interest, such as the use of frequencies resulting from the digital television switchover, as well as the ac143
commodation of new radio systems in the radio spectrum.
The Radio Regulatory ("RR") Working Group unsurprisingly (because of its name) is concerned with legal, regulatory, and administrative matters associated with the use of the radio spectrum. This group
played a significant role in establishing the international regime necessary for the accommodation of pan-European mobile services, such as
GSM. 144 It is responsible for harmonizing licensing regimes and for facilitating and studying economic and market surveillance matters.
The Spectrum Engineering ("SE") Working Group concentrates on
technical issues. 14 5 Its importance is increasing with the multiplicity of
frequency-sharing arrangements, Short-Range Devices ("SRDs"), 146 and
spread-spectrum technology, as well as with the complexity of other techGuidelines for the RRC-04/05, http://www.ebu.ch/tech texts/tech-text-i37-2003.pdf (accessed Nov. 29, 2003).
142. See ERO, Terms of Referene for the FM Working Group ("ToR"), http://www.ero.dkl
22A8604D-B9A7-4D8F-BAC8-1AD6322B4DF7.W5Doc (accessed Apr. 29, 2005). Specifically, ToR Point 14 covers the duties of the Stockholm 61 Working Group, which include
the following: (1) Develop and agree on ECPs for the work of the Regional Radiocommunications Conference (RRC), (2) develop procedures to coordinate CEPT actions during the
course of the RRC, and (3) prepare and approve briefs for the members of CEPT national
delegations in order to present the European positions at the RRC.
143. See e.g., Draft European Common Proposal,ECP8, on Transitionfrom Analogue to
Digital TerrestrialBroadcasting (Sept. 25, 2003); see also Draft European Common Proposal, ECP 14, on Protection of Analogue and DigitalBroadcastingin the Preparationof the
Digital Plan (Sept. 25, 2003) (available at http://www.itu.int/md/meetingdoc.asp?type=
sitems&lang=E&parent=D02-SG02-C-0227). Both resolutions are related to ITU Resolution 1185 in connection with a coherent digital terrestrial broadcasting plan.
144. The ERC Decision of 24 October 1994 designated the frequency bands 890-915
MHz and 935-960 MHz for the introduction of the GSM system. ERC Decision of 24 October 1994, ERC/DEC/(94)01 (Oct. 24, 1994). According to this Decision, at least 2 x 9 MHz
shall be reserved for the introduction of GSM within the designated frequency bands. See
also ERC Decision of 21 March 1997, ERC/DEC(97)02 (Mar. 21, 1997) (discussing The Extended Frequency Bands to Be Used for the GSM Digital Pan-EuropeanCommunications
System, which modifies the 1994 decision in certain respects).
145. See Terms of Reference of the Working Group Spectrum Engineeringand its Active
Project Teams, (Oct. 2003) (on file with author) (denoting the various working groups, contacts, and responsible managers for the topics under study).
146. See e.g., ERC Recommendation 70-03 (Jan. 2005), which covers, inter alia, frequency bands and regulatory as well as informative parameters recommended for wideband data transmission systems formerly known as Radio Local Area Networks (RLANs)
within the band 2400-2483.5 MHz and known as High Performance Radio Local Area Networks (HIPERLANs) within the bands 5150-5350 MHz, 5470-5725 MHz, and 17.1-17.3

GHz.
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nologies being used or planned for new radiocommunication systems,
such as ultra-wideband ("UWB"). 14 7 This working group also coordi14
nates with ETSI on certain technical standards matters. 8
The ITU Working Group within the ECC coordinates CEPT actions
related to the preparation and course of the following ITU activities:
Meetings of the Council, Plenipotentiary Conferences, World Telecommunication Development Conferences, World Telecommunication Standardization Assemblies, and other meetings, as appropriate. 14 9 This
working group develops ECPs for these ITU meetings and prepares relevant briefs for the members of CEPT national delegations in order to
present the European position at these meetings. 1 50 Moreover, it consults with various bodies and organizations inside and outside the
CEPT, as well as with NRAs outside the CEPT, with the principal aim of
collecting information and broadening the support of CEPT positions.
The Conference Preparatory Group ("CPG") focuses on the preparation of ECPs for the WRCs and Radiocommunications Assemblies of the
ITU. 151 Its principal role is to prepare a set of ECPs for the relevant
conference so that the CEPT can approach the conference with a united
152
set of objectives, proposals, and beliefs.
In addition, Special Task Groups ("TGs") and Project Teams ("PTs")
deal with specific issues, such as UMTS, as well as technical regulations
and standards for interconnection. A Milestone Review Committee
("MRC") and General Milestone Review Committee ("GMR") facilitate
the licensing process and distinguish among certain types of PCS systems (e.g., "paper" S-PCS systems and "real" S-PCS systems). 1 53 GMR
147. See ERO SE24, Study on the Compatibility Between Ultra Wide Band Services, Aviation Services, and Provisional Limits, Version 3.0 (Mar. 2002) (discussing the possible
problems of ultra-wideband implementation and its effects on the aviation industry).
148. See ERO Website, Spectrum Engineering Working Group, http://www.ero.dk/
B927FC37-9B18-4FAD-BFF1-E9E7C8B3E6F3.W5Doc (accessed Apr. 29, 2005).
149. See generally ERO, Summary of ITU Radio Assembly Meeting June 2 - 6, 2003,
http://www.ero.dk/520338AC-2399-4359-A9D2-CBA53C64E98F.W5Doc (accessed May 25,
2005) (detailing various resolutions and reports arising from ECC and CEPT coordination
efforts with the ITU in the 2003 ITU conference).
150. Id.
151. See e.g., ERO, Report on WRC-03, http://www.ero.dk/wrc-03 (July 29, 2003) (reporting on the proceedings at the ITU 2003 World Radiocommunication Conference in Geneva).
152. See ERO, Terms of Reference for the Working Group "Conference Preparatory
Group" (WG CPG), http://www.ero.dk (accessed Mar. 31, 2005) (including a ten-point list of
consultative and preparatory objectives for the working group).
153. The ITU is concerned about the existence of "paper" satellites (i.e., satellites that
exist in a database or catalog but that have not been launched into space). Because of the
limited spectrum available to the mobile satellite service ("MSS"), it was decided that the
spectrum should be made available to those S-PCS systems that are likely to offer services
within the CEPT region by 2001. Also, committees have developed procedures that are
used to monitor and evaluate the progress of a satellite system toward the offering of ser-
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procedures can be applied to all radio frequency bands, at least in
principle.
Throughout its broad overall infrastructure, the ECC deals with an
enormous variety of topics. All existing and potential uses of the radio
spectrum are embraced by the Committee and its working groups as legitimate topics of discussion and analysis. Given the description in the
foregoing section, at any given meeting, it would not be unusual for
members to address such diverse topics as frequency allocation for radio
amateurs, UMTS, UWB, or compatibility of new radar systems. This interdisciplinary nature of the working groups cannot be avoided. In fact,
many working group members have responsibilities in other groups at
the ITU or in their own governments, and some work as consultants in
private industry.
3.

Frequency Tables and Recordkeeping

Publication of records and tables of data is a central function of the
154
ERO. One area where the ERO has been active is in numbering,
which involves the organization of public use telecommunications service
numbers in terms of format and structure (groups of digits contain specific elements used for identification of services, geographic areas, networks, customers, and other relevant data). With regard to the radio
spectrum, however, Europe has thus far lacked a comprehensive frequency table like the one produced by the U.S. government. 15 5 The ERO
is officially charged with the task of creating such a table, and this work

vice over the CEPT in order to help eliminate the possibility of "paper" satellites within
CEPT member countries. See ERC Decision of 30 June 1997 on the Harmonised Use of
Spectrum for Satellite Personal Communication Services (S-PCS) operating within the
bands 1610-1626.5 MHz, 2483.5-2500 MHz, 1980-2010 MHz, and 2170-2200 MHz, ERC/
DEC(97)03 (June 30, 1997).
154. The European Telephony Numbering Space ("ETNS") is a pan-European numbering system. For example, a new ETNS code-3883-can be used in the same way as a
country code, allowing pan-European companies, organizations, and individuals to gain
Europe-wide access to their services. While ETNS numbering is coordinated tangentially
by the ERO, however, other numbering matters are also managed by parent CEPT, sister
ETSI, and other standards-setting organizations and individual countries within the ITU.
See Europa, Background Paperon the Implementation of the European Telephony Numbering Space, http://europa.eu.int/information-society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/publiconsult/
etnsworkshop/etns background-paper.ws-v2.pdf (accessed Oct. 12, 2003) (citing the following directive as a legal basis for this numbering system: Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electroniccommunications networks and services
(the "Universal Service Directive"), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002 at 51).
155. See U.S. Department of Commerce, United States Frequency Allocations: The Radio Spectrum, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf (accessed Feb. 28, 2004).
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in progress is expected to be completed by 2008.156 Furthermore, in January 2002 the ERO launched the ERO Frequency Information System
("EFIS"), which is a publicly searchable database that provides a major
step forward in frequency tracking. 15 7 With this tool, the ERO aims to
provide a valuable service to all parties interested in spectrum allocation
and use. In addition, the EFIS database is a significant harmonization
measure in line with the Decision of the Council and European Parliament on Radio Spectrum Policy, which requires governments to publish
their allocation information.' 15
EFIS's searchable online tool provides comparative spectrum metrics across Europe, as well as related information (e.g., information on
CEPT activities), but the data it provides may not be entirely accurate,
and companies hoping to deploy frequency-related services may not legally rely upon it. 1 5 9 So far, the tool is maintained on a voluntary basis
by the individual countries through the framework of the CEPT (although the Radio Spectrum Decision discussed earlier, plans to make
EFIS-like systems a legal requirement at some point in the future).
However, EFIS marks a clear tendency in the direction of European harmonization. For example, various radio interface specifications are
noted to be in compliance with the Radio and Telecommunications Terminal Equipment ("RTTE") Directive 160 and other national or international regulations. 16 1 Further, a comprehensive table showing the use of
frequencies on the European level-called the European Common Allo156. See ERC Report 25, The European Table of FrequencyAllocations and Utilisations
Covering the Frequency Range 9 kHz to 275 GHz, http://www.ero.dk/documentation/docs/
docfiles.asp?docid=1650 (accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
157. See ERO Frequency Information System, General Search for Spectrum Utilisations, http://www.efis.dk (accessed Dec. 2, 2003).
158. Decision No. 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in a Regulatory Framework for Radio Spectrum Policy in the European Community, http://europa.
eu.int/information-society/policy/radio-spectrum/docs/poicy-outline/decision_6762002/en.
is therefore necessary to complement
pdf (accessed Apr 30, 2005) (At para. 15, to-wit: "[i]t
existing Community and international requirements for publication of information on the
use of radio spectrum.")
159. EFIS Users' Manual, available at http://www.efis.dk/documents/help/help-public.
htm (accessed Apr. 30, 2005) (noting at para. 1 that "Although all is being done to ensure
that the data contained in EFIS is valid and up-to-date, the ERO cannot be held responsible for any wrong information contained in EFIS. It should be clear that EFIS is an information tool and not a legally binding instrument").
160. See Directive 1999/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9
March 1999, on radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual recognition of their conformity, O.J. L 91/10 (Mar. 9, 1999).
161. See ERO, FinalActs of the CEPT T-DAB PlanningMeeting (4) Maastricht,2002,
Special Arrangement of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Ad.
ministrations (CEPT) relating to the use of the band 1452 - 1479.5 MHz for Terrestrial
Digital Audio Broadcasting(T-DAB), http://www.ero.dk/Maastricht-e (accessed December
2, 2003). Also, for Digital Audio Broadcasting ("DAB"), see id. at http://www.ero.dk/Wi-e.
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cation ("ECA") table-has been published on the basis of the results of
Detailed Spectrum Investigations ("DSI"s).1 6 2 Thus, the results of the
DSI process are used in strategic planning efforts involving the spectrum, providing a means of anticipating the requirements of the various
spectrum users. The DSI project has been a cooperative effort between
the ERO, private industry, individual governments (particularly with respect to military uses), 16 3 users, and stakeholders (e.g., industry, consumers, governments) of the radio spectrum.
16 4
The DSI process is made up of three phases:
1. DSI Phase I, covering the band 3400 MHz - 105 GHz, a plan developed in 1992-1993165

2. DSI Phase II, covering the band 29.7 - 960 MHz, a plan developed
in 1994-1995166

3. DSI Phase III, covering the band 862 - 3400 MHz, a plan developed
in 1998-2000167
Additional ERO publication responsibilities in this area include the following: (1) support and collaborate with national frequency management
authorities to ensure that frequencies are catalogued in a coherent and
consistent fashion, (2) publish ECC Decisions and Recommendations and
keep a record of the implementation of these decisions into law, (3) oversee the registrar service for the European Telephony Numbering Space,
and (4) facilitate harmonization of certain radio devices in line with the
RTTE Directive. 168 For example, the ERO regularly maintains a list of
162. See generally Electronic Communications Committee, ECC Decision of 17 October
2003 on the Publicationof NationalTables of Frequency Allocations and Utilizations,ECC /
DECI(03)05, http://www.ero.dk/documentation/docs/doc98/official/Word/ECCDECO305.
DOC (accessed Apr. 30 2005).
163. Military frequency requirements included in the table have been supported by the
NATO Joint Civil/Military Frequency Agreement ("NJFA") and by ongoing agreements
within the civil/military cooperation in Europe. The "NATO Military Position for the World
Radio Communication Conference 2000 (WRC-2000)" was approved by NATO's Military
Committee on March 24, 2000. It concluded two years of preparation in close cooperation
with National Frequency Management authorities for WRC-2000, which was held from
May 8, 2000, to June 2, 2000. NATO Update, Week of 22 - 28 Mar. 2000, http://www.nato.
int/doculupdate/2000/0322/eng.htm (accessed Apr. 30, 2005).
164. For a description of the full process as of early 2003, See ERC, The European Table
of FrequencyAllocations and UtilisationsCovering the Frequency Range 9 kHz to 275 GHz,
http://www.ero.dkleca-change (describing the full process as of early 2003); see also ERO,
Final Report on the DSI Phase III, http://www.ero.dk/exec-sum (accessed Apr 30, 2005).
165. See European Radiocommunications Office, Results of the Detailed Spectrum Investigation, First Phase, 2400 MHz to 105 GHz 1 (1993).
166. See European Radiocommunications Office, Results of the Detailed Spectrum Investigation Phase II Covering the Spectrum Between 29.7 and 960 MHz 1 (1995).
167. See European Radiocommunications Office, FinalReport on the Detailed Spectrum
Investigation DSI Phase III 862-3400 MHz 1 (1998-2000).
168. Directive 1999/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March
1999 on radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and the mutual rec-
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specific frequencies and devices that are only "partially harmonized" and
of the countries that are not in compliance.1 69 The RTTE Directive represents one of the earliest and most important areas of frequency harmonization, and the ERO's "policing" role in this regard may be an
indication of its ongoing role in the future. Therefore, where the European Union will decide upon policy, the ERO will provide technical recommendations for the implementation of that policy and act as an
information clearing house for technical compliance of European Union
law.
4.

One-Stop Shopping for Licenses-Satellite and Other Services

As noted on the ERO Web site, the One-Stop-Shopping ("OSS")procedure for certain licenses managed by ERO/ECC is "aimed at facilitating the provision of certain liberalized telecommunications services in a
number of European countries.' u 7 0 Principally, this procedure applies to
satellite licenses, potentially one of the more promising aspects of spectrum centralization. 1 71' 172 The Web site goes on to note the following:
The [OSS] Service Directive . . .provides for the liberalization of fixed

telecommunications services other than voice telephony. 17 3 However,
each individual country may subject the provision of these services to
an individual licensing or a declaration procedure. Prior to the launch
of the OSS, a service provider wishing to provide one of the liberalized
telecommunications services in one or more of the CEPT countries had
no option but to contact the NRAs of those countries to obtain the necessary information on the definition of the service, the licensing regime,
the conditions of service provision, the constraints and limitations inognition of their conformity, available at http://www.rtte.org/documents/dir99-5.htm (accessed Apr. 30, 2005).
169. See ERO, Implementation of ERC 70-03, http://www.ero.dk/srd-impl (accessed Apr.
30, 2005).
170. Welcome to ERO, supra n. 109; see also ERC Decision of 29 November 1999 on the
Establishment of a Regulatory Database of licensing regimes for telecommunication networks and services, ERC/DEC/(99)22 (Nov. 29, 1999) available at http://www.ero.dk/documentation/docs/ docfiles.asp?docid=1575 (accessed Apr. 30, 2005) (specifying database and
aggregation characteristics of the OSS for certain telecommunications services).
171. See ERC Recommendation (00)01 on the Establishment ofa CEPT One-Stop-Shopping Procedure for Satellite Licenses and Authorisations, ERC/REC/(00)01) (May 30, 2000).
http://www.ero.dkldocumentation/docs/docfiles.asp?docid=1580 (accessed Apr. 30 2005).
172. The implementation of OSS for satellite applications happened in mid 2001 for
most CEPT countries. As of October 4, 2002, the following fourteen countries had accepted
all satellite applications through the OSS procedure: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In addition, France and Monaco accepted most applications. Source: ERO OCC Implementation Status Spreadsheet (on file with the author).
173. Commission Directive of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services, 90/388/EEC (June 28, 1990) ( known as the "Service Directive").
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volved in the provision of the given service, and so on.174
The OSS procedure has the potential to simplify the licensing process for
telecommunications services and reduce the number of contact points
and official documents that a service provider must deal with and complete, respectively. As part of this aggregationprocedure, the ERO does
not itself grant licenses; instead, it offers a framework for centralizing
the licensing application process. The ERO compiles the application
materials and sends those materials to the NRAs, which as stated earlier, are the individual authorities of each country. Responses are also
compiled within a single document that summarizes the results of the
OSS procedure, and any licenses granted by the NRAs are attached to
the document. 175 The ERO then sends the package back to the applicant.
The entire process takes no more than nine weeks.
Reality has dimmed this once optimistic vision of one-stop shopping,
however, since the OSS procedure has hardly been used since its implementation in 1999 (and it has thus far never been expanded for nonsatellite applications). 17 6 As commentator Gerry Oberst notes, the procedure is inefficient since only a few countries use it:
Today, the heart of the problem and one reason the OSS is not perceived
in better terms is that it is not used as frequently as the industry predicted, and the follow-up to it has not produced progress on the regulators' side. Partially, this reflects the fact that not all CEPT countries
have implemented the OSS. Those countries presenting the most troublesome national bureaucracy typically are also the last ones to fully implement CEPT decisions which, unlike EU directives, are not legally
binding. The countries that first implemented the OSS were typically
those with the more efficient licensing structures ....
Thus, the OSS
has become the proverbial "chicken and egg," where companies do not
use it as often as predicted because not enough countries have put it
into place, which causes countries that have implemented it to say it is
1 77
not worth the bother.
Although no public information is available on the number of applications processed by the OSS, an e-mail exchange with the ERO office
indicates that only about ten applications have been filed. Although the
ERO remains optimistic, it is unlikely that this OSS procedure has much
178
of a future.
174. Welcome to ERO, supra n. 109.
175. See ERO, OSS for Other LiberalisedServices, http://www.ero.dk/oss (accessed Apr.
30, 2005).
176. See Gerry Oberst, Regulatory Review: Satellite Licensing - Under Threat, http://
www.viasatellite.com (Jan. 1, 2004).
177. Id.
178. See E-mail from Fabienne Abadie, ERO, to Patrick S. Ryan, "Inquiry from a Researcher," (Jan. 15, 2004) (copy on file with the author). As Abadie explains:
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THE NEW FRAMEWORK

FIRST LIBERALIZATION, THEN HARMONIZATION

Not surprisingly, few would have characterized the European Union
wireless market in the 1980s and in most of the 1990s as a "free market."
As in the United States, the first European wireless licenses were
granted by default to the incumbent operators. Unlike in the United
States, however, the incumbent operators and the state maintained close
relationships, leading to the protection of a somewhat unhealthy combination of public and private interests. To further complicate the matter,
the companies' CEOs were governmental appointees, and their employees were civil servants who often could not be fired for any reason, even if
such an action were warranted. The process of separating the telecom
sector from government control has been an arduous one, and the topic
tends to generate heated discussions even today. In fact, it is only in the
past couple of years that the member states' telecommunications regulatory bodies have reorganized in an attempt to provide greater separation
between the government and the private sector. For example, the
French telecommunications regulatory authority, ART (l'Autorit6 de
R6gulation des T6l6communications), was created only in 1997.179 On
the other hand, in the UK the government set up its Federal Office for
Communications as early as 1984. That said, the resulting twenty-one
regulatory bodies that have since emerged in the UK audiovisual sector
represent an impressive bureaucracy. Accordingly, a broad reform process was undertaken to reduce and combine many of the bodies to form a
single Office of Communications.1 8 0 Although the process will take some
time to complete,' 8 ' the new office has been formed, and it is has been
The OSS was launched in October 2000 and since then about 10 applications have
been filed via the system. Most applications concerned authorisations for SNG
[Satellite News Gathering], in one country. Other applications were for VSAT
[Very Small Aperture Terminal] authorisations.... Although the modest number
of applications filed and the fact that these did not concern applications in several
countries simultaneously may look like a poor result, operators often mentioned
that the efforts carried out for setting up the OSS had not been in vain. It made
the licensing situation more transparent and highlighted the heavy requirements
that some countries have imposed on satellite applicants, encouraging lighter regulation and further harmonisation.

Id.
179. ART, L'Autorite De Regulation Des Telecommunications, http://www.art-telecom.fr
(accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
180. Higgam, Fitzpatrick, & Calow, The Future of United Kingdom ContentRegulation:
A Round Peg in a Rectangular Box or Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, 8 Computer and Telecomm. L. Rev. 220 (2001).
181. Communications White Paper, A New Future For Communications, http://www.
communicationswhitepaper.gov.uk/ (accessed Mar. 31, 2005) (providing the Draft Communications Bill, White Paper, and other materials).
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operational since December 2003.182
An overview of relevant telecommunications-related legislation-old
and new-is provided in the Appendix. The European Union liberalization process in telecommunications began in earnest with the passage of
the 1988 Terminal Equipment Directive.' 8 3 The Directive targeted telecommunications markets in general, and it initially had little direct impact on the wireless sector except for the obvious categorization of GSM
and cordless phones 1 84 as "terminal equipment." Although the process
has been painful at times, many argue that out of the molasses-slow liberalization process a wireless market has emerged in the European
Union (1) that is more standardized 8 5 and consumer friendly than the
U.S. market and (2) that has made much more spectrum available than
is available in the U.S. market.1 8 6 This latter point merits reemphasis:
In the European Union, more than fifty percent more spectrum is availa18 7
ble (i.e., licensed for mobile applications) than in the United States.
Arguably, the most revolutionary legislation in the European Union
was the 1990 Services Directive.1 8 8 Although this directive categorically
exempted nearly all important wireless services,1 8 9 the member states
were nonetheless required to separate the operational entities from their
governments since the interconnection between the two was deemed incompatible with the policies of market integration and an abuse of a
182. See Ofcom, Welcome to Ofcom, http://www.ofcom.org.uk (accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
183. Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of May 16, 1988, on competition in the markets
in telecommunications terminal equipment, OJ L 131 (May 16, 1988).
184. "Cordless" here means telephones operating in the unlicensed spectrum bands connected at home or in an office directly to a fixed line.
185. GSM was a tremendously successful all-European standard that led to the transparency of networks for intra-community calling, SMS messaging, and "caller pays" services. In contrast, four different wireless standards emerged in the United States, with the
disadvantage that many networks and user devices (mobile phones) were not compatible.
SIM cards, for example, practically do not exist in the U.S. system, and SMS messaging did
not work across networks until very recently (both of these facts tend to shock Europeans).
See The Economist, The Global Mobile, http://www.economist.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?Story-id=246191 (Oct. 7, 1999).
186. See generally Patrick S. Ryan, Wireless Spectrum Allocation and New Technologies:
Reviewing Old and New Paradigms Through a Case Study of the U.S. Ultra Wideband
Proceeding (January 10, 2003). German Working Papers in Law and Economics Working
Paper No. 8. http://ssrn.com/abstract=472321.
187. In the United States, only 189.1 megahertz of spectrum is available. In contrast,
305 megahertz is available in Germany, and 346 megahertz is available in England. See
Yochi Dreazen Space Wars, Wall Street Journal R9 (Sept. 23, 2002).
188. Council Directive 90 1388/EEC of June 28, 1990, on competition in the markets for
telecommunications services, OJ L 192 (June 28, 1990).
189. Id. at Article 1 (2), to wit: "This Directive shall not apply to telex, mobile radiotelephony, paging and satellite services."
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dominant position per Articles 82 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.190 Wireless services were also brought within the Directive's purview with the
passage of an amendment in 1994 for satellite services' 9 1 and another
amendment in 1996 for mobile services. 192 Specifically, the Directive
mandated the "withdrawal of all special or exclusive rights for the supply
of telecommunications services,"1 9 3 and it required that licenses be
granted under conditions that are "objective, non-discriminatory and
transparent, that reasons are given for any refusal, and that there is a
procedure for appealing against any such refusal."1 94 The transparency
principle permeates various aspects of the new regulatory framework, as
will be discussed below.
Numerous pieces of European Union legislation are aimed at further
liberalizing, harmonizing, and simplifying regulations in the telecommunications sector. Some of the most important directives and decisions
were passed within the last few months and will be discussed here.
These directives and decisions are said to be "evolutionary" rather than
"revolutionary,"1 9 5 and as an underlying objective they seek to "base the
application of ex ante sector specific regulation on [market] competition
law."1 9 6 The new framework simplifies measures at the European Union
level by reducing the total amount of legislation from around twenty to
eight.' 9 7 The new directives and their progeny are detailed below, but
note that only a discussion of the salient aspects related to wireless communications is within the scope of this article. An overview table that
shows the directives that are being replaced under the new framework is
included in the Appendix.

190. Id. at Recitals 12-17 (referring to the previous numbering, Articles 91 and 86,
respectively).
191. Commission Directive 94146/EC of 13 October 1994 amending Directive 88/301/
EEC and Directive 90/388/EEC in particularwith regard to satellite communications, OJ
L 268 (Oct. 13, 1994).
192. Commission Directive 96121EC of 16 January 1996 amending Directive 90/388/
EEC with regard to the implementation of full competition in telecommunications market,
OJ L 74 (Jan. 16, 1996).
193. 90/388/EEC at Article 2 (1).
194. Id.
195. Christian Hocepied, Presentation, The New EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications:From Sector Specific Regulation to Competition Law (Washington
D.C., May 20-21, 2002).
196. Id.
197. See Michael H. Ryan & Reinhard Schu, An Introduction to the New EU Regulatory
Framework For Electronic Communications, http://www.aporter.pair.com/articles/newframework.pdf (Sept. 2002).
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THE FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE

The Framework Directive1 98 was arguably the keystone directive in
the harmonization procedure. With respect to wireless communications,
Article 9 of the Directive requires the member states to "ensure that the
allocation and assignment of such radio frequencies by national regulatory authorities are based on objective, transparent,non-discriminatory
and proportionate criteria." 199 However, the Directive does not take a
position as to how governments should apportion the spectrum (e.g.,
comparative hearings or auctions). While the Commission has undertaken numerous studies to review the best way to administer the spectrum and to reallocate it in the future, 200 ' 201 at this time no concrete
action has been taken either at the member state level or the Community level. It is also important to note that the Framework Directive
(like many of its regulatory siblings from the same package) incorporates
the Radio Spectrum Decision into it by reference in both the main text
there
and the recitals, as described in greater detail below. 20 2 Although
20 3
were some initial complaints, the implementation is going well.
198. Directive 2002/21 IEC of the European Parliamentand of the Council of 7 March
2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 108 (24 Apr. 2002).
199. Id. at Article 9(1) [emphasis added].
200. See BIPE Consulting, Digital Switchover in Broadcasting, http://europa.eu.int/in2 4 2
formation-society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/studies/documents/final-report_1 0 0 .pdf
(Apr. 12, 2002).
201. Though no concrete action has been taken either at the member state level or the
Community level, the UK has adopted the most forward-thinking position on spectrum
trading at this stage. See Martin Cave, UK Radio Spectrum Management Review, and
many other consultant reports and industry comments, http://www.spectrumreview.radio.
gov.uk.
202. Directive 2002/21 fEC, OJ L 108 at Article 9(2) (requiring harmonization of the use
of radio frequencies in accordance with the Spectrum Decision); Article 9(4) (ensuring that
competition is not distorted and requiring that harmonization, as implemented by the
Spectrum Decision, does not result in the change of use of a given frequency). For a recital
reference, see Recital 19 (noting that one of the objectives of the Framework Directive is to
"facilitate the work under [the Spectrum] Decision").
203. See Sylvia Alonso Salterain, Review of the European Telecommunications Legal
Framework - Article 6 of the Framework Directive, a Violation of the InstitutionalBalance
Set Forth by the E. U. Treaty, 2002 C.T.L.R. I, at 1. Salterain decried the loss of sovereignty
to the European Union. Id. As an official of the Spanish regulatory body, she opined in a
sweeping argument that the consultation and transparency mechanism of Article 6 "constitutes an imbalance in the institutional arrangements set forth by the European Union
Treaty; ... [and] goes beyond the scope of what any transparency mechanism would permit." Id. Thus, Salterain has suggested that European Union involvement is becoming
expansive and should be restrained, a point of view that is representative of the type of
resistance that the European Union faced when it tried to break up the PTTs. Id. Positions like Salterain's are likely to be mirrored by governments that have maintained their
own interpretation of "transparency" and that are resistant to coming under the scope of
competition law. As it turns out, governments like those of Spain and France have not
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THE AUTHORIZATION DIRECTIVE

The Authorization Directive 20 4 is relevant to the regulatory authorization of "all forms of electronic communications networks and services," 20 5 most specifically to their regulatory authorization (hence the
name). The Directive prohibits limitations on the number of new entrants in the telecommunications market, 20 6 except, with respect to the
radio spectrum, to the extent required to ensure an efficient use of radio
frequencies.20 7 Such restrictions, however, are left to the member states
to manage, subject of course to overlay EU competition laws and
doctrine.
D.

THE ACCESS DIRECTIVE
20 8

The Access Directive
has numerous implications for wireless services. First, the term "access" is carefully defined so that it includes the
availability of the infrastructure used for the installation of wireless facilities (e.g., attachment to buildings, ducts, and masts). 20 9 Second, the
Directive requires the competent authorities in the relevant member
states to promote laws and impose obligations to allow access to the infrastructure for broadcasting, particularly in the scope of the digital
transition of radio and television. 2 10 Finally, the Directive authorizes
member states to enact transparency legislation that may require the
disclosure of technical information regarding network characteristics,
the provision of non-discriminatory access to others, and government in2 11
tervention in order to control costs.
been entirely transparent in their wireless licensing procedures, and they have reason to
fear that further inspection into their practices may reveal favoritism. This is particularly
the case for Wireless Local Loop (WLL) and 3G licenses, where less-transparent "beauty
contests" were chosen over auctions.
204. Directive2002/201EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council of March 7,
2002, on the authorizationof electronic communications networks and services, OJ L 108
(Apr. 24, 2002).
205. Id. at Article 1 (1) [emphasis added].
206. Id. at Article 3. For a related discussion, see Id. at Recital 7 (stating that "[t]he
least onerous authorization system possible should be used to allow the provision of electronic communications networks and services in order to stimulate the development of new
electronic communications services and pan-European communications networks and services and to allow service providers and consumers to benefit from the economies of scale of
the single market").
207. Directive 2002/20/EC, OJ L 108 at Article 6, which incorporates by reference Annex B ("Conditions which may be attached to rights of use for radio frequencies").
208. Directive 2002/ 19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March
2002, on access to, and interconnection of electronic communications networks and associated facilities, OJ L 108 (Apr. 24, 2002).
209. Id. at Article 2(a).
210. Id. at Article 5 (1) (b).
211. Id. at Articles 9 - 13.
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THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE DIRECTIVE

The Universal Service Directive 212 is a complicated directive that
attempts to harmonize the concept of "universal service" within the European Community, while at the same time providing certain consumer
protection measures. We will only review a few relevant portions of the
Directive that (tangentially) relate to wireless providers. Although the
Directive does not define "universal service" in black-and-white terms, it
does note the importance of creating a universal access number ("112")
for emergency services, 2 13 and it remarks upon past successes involving
European "universal service," such as the addition of the numbers "00"
community-wide for international calling. 2 14 These aspects are thus imposed on GSM and UMTS providers. The Directive carries wide exceptions to allow the member states to adopt independent measures in
accordance with Articles 30 and 46 of the Directive, which address public
security, public policy, and public morality. 2 15 As we have stated, little
of the Directive's content directly applies to wireless communications (as
opposed to communications and consumer interests in general), although
Recital 8 includes a sweeping statement that all forms of communication
are to be included within its scope:
A fundamental requirement of universal service is to provide users on
request with a connection to the public telephone network at a fixed
location, at an affordable price .... There should be no constraints on
the technical means by which the connection is provided, allowing for
wired or wireless technologies, nor any constraints 2on
which operators
16
provide part or all of universal service obligations.
As a practical matter, however, the Universal Service Directive is
not a major consideration for wireless providers. Wireless companies are
confronted with universal service policies in their license bids, and although there is little empirical data to support this comment: one might
surmise that governments accepts the bids while hoping to contractually
obligate the licensee to fulfill the requirements. Most auctions have coverage requirements, and all comparative hearings (also known as
"beauty contests") are associated with objective coverage criteria that
seek to provide a maximum footprint for the delivery of services to the
population.
212. Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council of 7 March
2002, on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks
and services, OJ L 108 (Apr. 24, 2002).
213. Id. at Recital 13.
214. Id. at Recital 37.
215. Id. at Articles 30 and 46.
216. Id. at Recital 8 [emphasis added].
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THE RADIO SPECTRUM DECISION

The Radio Spectrum Decision 2 17 attempts to link European Union
spectrum demands to its policy initiatives through the creation of two
2 18
new entities: (1) the Radio Spectrum Committee and (2) the RSPG.
These entities are described below.
1.

The Radio Spectrum Committee

The Radio Spectrum Committee, launched in July 2002,219 will assist and advise the Commission on radio spectrum policy issues, on the
coordination of policy approaches (advisory procedures), and, where appropriate, on harmonizing conditions and legislative measures (regulatory procedures) with regard to the availability and efficient use of the
radio spectrum necessary for the establishment and functioning of the
common market. The advisory procedure of the Committee will provide
feedback to the Commission, which, in turn, shall issue mandates to the
CEPTh20 for implementation. 2 2 1 Finally, one relatively concrete aspect
of the Radio Spectrum Decision is its requirement that member states
regularly publish their radio frequency allocation tables (a transparency
2 22
measure), thus making them available to the public.
2.

The Radio Spectrum Policy Group

The purpose of the RSPG is to adopt opinions in order to assist and
advise the Commission on radio spectrum policy issues, on the coordination of policy approaches, and, where appropriate, on harmonized conditions with regard to the availability and efficient use of the radio
spectrum necessary for the establishment and functioning of the internal
market. The members of the RSPG are representatives of the member
217. Decision No. 676/20021EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7
March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community, OJ L 108 (Apr. 24, 2002).
218. Id. at Articles 3 and 4.
219. See Commission Press Release, Commission Creates Radio Spectrum Policy Group
and EuropeanRegulators Group, IP/02/1171 (Jul. 29, 2002) (specifying the creation of the
Radio Spectrum Policy Group and a European regulators group).
220. Membership in CEPT, which is based in Denmark, extends well beyond the EC
(CEPT has forty-four members). See European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations, Welcome to the CEPT Website, http://www.cept.org (accessed Mar.
31, 2005).
221. See Europa - Information Society, Policies: Radio Spectrum, http://europa.eu.int/
information-society/policy/radiospectrun/currentindex-en.htm (accessed Apr 30 2005)
(noting that "Pursuant to Article 4 of the Radio Spectrum Decision, the Commission may
issue mandates to the CEPT for the development of technical implementing measures with
a view to ensuring harmonised conditions for the availability and efficient use of radio
spectrum; such mandates shall set the task to be performed and the timetable therefore").
222. See Radio Spectrum Decision at Article 5.
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states and of the Commission. Representatives, the candidate countries,
the European Parliament, the CEPT, and ETSI attend RSPG meetings
as observers. The RSPG is expected to provide extensive consultation in
a forward-looking manner on technological, market, and regulatory developments relating to the use of the radio spectrum in the context of
European Union policies on electronic communications, transport, and
research and development. Such consultation should involve all relevant
radio spectrum users, both commercial and non-commercial, as well as
any other interested party.
3. Activities of the Radio Spectrum Committee and the Radio
Spectrum Policy Group
The Radio Spectrum Committee and the RSPG are relatively new
and are only now beginning to take shape. The RSPG's dedicated Web
22 3
As of
site, for example, has only been active for a little over a year.
March 2004, a dedicated Web site for the Radio Spectrum Committee is
not yet available, although the Committee has begun to issue some mandates to the CEPT. 2 24 The RSPG held a meeting on spectrum trading in
December 2003, and it also held some meetings regarding the switchover
to digital broadcasting in February 2004. Both the Radio Spectrum
Committee and the RSPG employ only a handful of staff, and the degree
of progress made by these groups will have to be watched closely in the
coming months.
G.

THE PATH TOWARDS COMPETITION REGULATION

Jean-Francois Pons 2 2 5 and Christian Hocepied 226 of the Competition Directorate have championed the new framework as a major step
towards the elimination of sector-specific regulation and as a shift towards general competition law principles. Pons described this noteworthy change in policy by stating that the Commission will "only regulate
where [it does] not believe competition remedies will be sufficient to rem223. See RSPG, Radio Spectrum Policy Group Web Site, http://rspg.groups.eu.int/ (accessed Mar. 18, 2004).
224. Europa, Mandate to CEPT to Harmonize Radio Spectrum Use for Ultra-Wideband
Systems in the European Union, http://europa.eu.intlinformation-society/topics/radio-spectrum/docs/pdf madates/mandate-uwb.pdf (accessed Mar. 31, 2005) (setting April
2005 as the deadline to provide a final report to the Commission).
225. Deputy Director General, Competition Directorate General, European Commission, Brussels.
226. Head of Section, Telecommunications and Post Unit, Competition Directorate General, European Commission, Brussels.
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edy persistent market failures." 2 2 7 One of the most significant features
of this position is the European Commission's publication of new guidelines for market analysis and for the assessment of significant market
228
power ("SMP").
Nonetheless, the concept of "dominance" (and the thirty years of jurisprudence that defines dominance) 22 9 will ultimately replace the SMP
concept. 230 In addition, new guidelines have gone through a long process
to clarify matters for sectors that are susceptible to ex ante regulation
per Article 15(2) of the Framework Directive, 23 1 and these guidelines
will be used by the NRAs in analyzing their relevant markets. The consultation procedure has been completed, a working document details initial findings, 232 and comments were analyzed by the Commission,
resulting in a definitive guidelines document 23 3 and a Commission Recommendation. 23 4 In this context, it is noteworthy (particularly for the
purposes of this article, which is based on wireless technology) that the
Commission has made clear distinctions between the provision and
2 35
treatment of fixed versus mobile applications.
227. Jean-Frangois Pons, Speech, Overview of MajorDevelopments in European Competition PolicyAffecting the Communications Industry 6 (Washington D.C., May 20-21, 2002)
(available at http://europa.eu.int/ comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2002-018 en.pdf).
228. See, e.g., Europa, Commission IssuesMarket Power Assessment Guidelinesfor Electronic Communications, http://europa.eu.int/comm/competitionAiberalization/others/i021016_en.pdf (accessed Jan. 1, 2004) (discussing the adoption and release of guidelines for
the assessment of SMP).
229. See generally Continental Can, Case 6/72; United Brands, Case 27/76.
230. Id. Under current (pre-new framework) conditions, an operation would be presumed to be dominant if it possesses a market share of twenty-five percent or greater.
Under the new framework, market share will be only one consideration. Other single or
joint dominance considerations will include (1) the overall size of the undertaking, (2) the
control of "essential facility"-type infrastructures, (3) technological advantages, (4) undue
relative buying power, (5) vertical integration, and (6) the absence of potential competition.
231. Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council of 7 March
2002 (Mar. 7, 2002).
232. Europa, Working Document, On Relevant Product and Service Markets within the
electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council on a common regulatory
framework for electronic communication networks and services, http://europa.eu.int (accessed Mar. 31, 2005).
233. Commission Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power under the Community Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications
Networks and Services, O.J. C 165/6 (July 11, 2002).
234. Commission Recommendation ofll February 2003 on relevant product and service
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in
accordancewith Directive 2002/21/EC of the EuropeanParliamentand of the Council on a
common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and services, O.J. L
114/45, 2003/311/EC (May 8, 2003).
235. Id. at 8 (generally); id. at Section 4.2.1 (for fixed services as distinguished from
mobile); id. at 21 (generally); id. at Section 4.3 (for services provided at non-fixed locations).
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CONCLUSION

Europe is unique in many ways. Indeed, one of the more distinctive
characteristics of the European Union framework is the way in which its
institutions are geographically separated from each other, oftentimes by
hundreds of kilometers. Not only is distance a factor, but so too are culture and language. 2 36 Telecommunications, therefore, plays a practical
role in European Union policymaking itself. As a result, European lawmaking institutions, though scattered throughout the Continent, have
managed to succeed in spite of this distance. For example, the Executive
Body, the European Commission, is based in the heart of Europe in
Brussels, Belgium. However, the European Court of Justice, located in
Luxembourg, is 212 kilometers away from Brussels; 23 7 the European
Parliament and European Court of Human Rights, based in Strasbourg,
France, are 430 kilometers away; and the European Central Bank, operating out of Frankfurt am Main, Germany, is 398 kilometers away. Centralized "interfaces" with private industry (e.g., ETSI and CENELEC),
likewise, have been divided throughout the Community. Furthermore,
this distributed approach penetrates all aspects of the European policymaking structure. For example, the European Patent Office is based
in Munich, Germany, and the European Trademark Office is based in
Alicante, Spain. Thus, a strong communications framework is not only a
matter of importance to the public, but it is also critical to the European
Union's ability to function smoothly as an economic community.
We have seen that the European Union has broken up the PTT
structure and has embraced open markets in telecommunications, a process that has taken root only within the past ten years. Thus, telecommunications management throughout the European Union has changed
from a process of coordination among government telecommunication
ministries to a more complicated consensus-building procedure among
private industries. However, as we have seen with the development of
various technology promotion programs like RACE (and its progeny), a
heavy public-private partnership in the development of new technologies
continues.
236. The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the European Union are Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish. See also Article 314 of the EC Treaty, which lays down the
principle of multilingualism. Article 21 states that every citizen of the Union may write to
any of the institutions or bodies in one of the languages mentioned in Article 314 and receive an answer in the same language. Finally, Council Regulation No. 1 of 15 April 1958
determined the languages to be used by the EEC, as amended after each enlargement
(thus, the number of languages increased further to accommodate the ten new accession
countries in May 2004).
237. All distances in this section were obtained by using MapQuest.Mapquest.com, Inc.,
Mapquest, http://www.mapquest.com (accessed Nov. 14, 2003).
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How does this complex debate relate to spectrum management? To
date, the answer to this question is unknown. The European Union
opened its own spectrum management office (the Radio Spectrum Committee and the RSPG) only a few months ago, and the future of this organization, which is still in its infancy, and the eventual role it will play
within the individual sovereign states are as yet uncertain. At this
point, the organization is undertaking a couple of limited studies. However, some trends are already clear, such as trends toward the continued
privatization of telecommunications and the transfer of responsibility
from the public to the private realm. However, the individual member
states' willingness to concede spectrum responsibility to the emerging
European structure is, at this point, doubtful.
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APPENDIX: SIMPLIFICATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LEGISLATION UNDER THE NEW FRAMEWORK
The following table shows the new framework legislation that has
replaced some of the old telecommunications legislation.

Present Directives

New Directives
("New Framework")
That Replace Old Directives

Liberalization

Services Directive (90/388/EEC)
Satellite (94/46/EC)
Cable (95/51/EC)
Mobile (96/2/EC)
Full Competition (96/19/EC)
Cable Ownership (99/64/EC)

Liberalization Directive
(2002/77/EC)

Liberalizationand Harmonization

ONP Framework Directive
(90/387/EEC) (amended by 97/51/EC)
Licensing Directive (97/13/EC)
GSM Directive (87/372/EEC)
ERMES Directive (90/544/EC)
DECT Directive (91/287/EEC)
S-PCS Decision (97/710/EC)
UMTS Decision (99/128/EC)
European Emergency Number
Decision (91/396/EC)
International Access Code Decision
(92/264/EEC)
ONP Leased Lines Directive
(92/44/EEC) (amended by 97/264/EC)
TV Standards Directive (95/47/EC)
Interconnection Directive (97/33/EC)
(amended by 98/61/EC)
Voice Telephony Directive (98/10/EC)
Telecoms Data Protection Directive
(97/66/EC)

Framework Directive
(2002/21/EC)
Authorization Directive
(2002/21/EC)
Access and Interconnection
Directive (2002/20/EC)
Unbundled Local Loop
Regulation (2000/2887)
Universal Service and User's
Rights Directive (2002/22/EC)
Data Protection Directive
(2002/58/EC)
Radio Spectrum Decision
(676/2002/EC)
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